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VOLUME IX





THE BROSS LECTURES . . . 1916

# FAITH JUSTIFIED BY PROGRESS

LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE LAKE FOREST  
COLLEGE ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE  
LATE WILLIAM BROSS

BY

HENRY WILKES WRIGHT, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LAKE FOREST COLLEGE

NEW YORK  
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1916

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## THE BROSS FOUNDATION

THE BROSS LIBRARY is an outgrowth of a fund established in 1879 by the late William Bross, Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois from 1866 to 1870. Desiring some memorial of his son, Nathaniel Bross, who died in 1856, Mr. Bross entered into an agreement with the "Trustees of Lake Forest University," whereby there was finally transferred to them the sum of forty thousand dollars, the income of which was to accumulate in perpetuity for successive periods of ten years, the accumulation of one decade to be spent in the following decade, for the purpose of stimulating the best books or treatises "on the connection, relation, and mutual bearing of any practical science, the history of our race, or the facts in any department of knowledge, with and upon the Chris-

tian Religion.” The object of the donor was to “call out the best efforts of the highest talent and the ripest scholarship of the world to illustrate from science, or from any department of knowledge, and to demonstrate the divine origin and the authority of the Christian Scriptures; and, further, to show how both science and revelation coincide and prove the existence, the providence, or any or all of the attributes of the only living and true God, ‘infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.’ ”

The gift contemplated in the original agreement of 1879 was finally consummated in 1890. The first decade of the accumulation of interest having closed in 1900, the Trustees of the Bross Fund began at this time to carry out the provisions of the deed of gift. It was determined to give the general title of “The Bross Library” to the series of books purchased and published with the proceeds

of the Bross Fund. In accordance with the express wish of the donor, that the "Evidences of Christianity" of his "very dear friend and teacher, Mark Hopkins, D.D.," be purchased and "ever numbered and known as No. 1 of the series," the Trustees secured the copyright of this work, which has been republished in a presentation edition as Volume I of the Bross Library.

The trust agreement prescribed two methods by which the production of books and treatises of the nature contemplated by the donor was to be stimulated:

1. The Trustees were empowered to offer one or more prizes during each decade, the competition for which was to be thrown open to "the scientific men, the Christian philosophers and historians of all nations." In accordance with this provision, a prize of \$6,000 was offered in 1902 for the best book fulfilling the conditions of the deed of gift, the competing manuscripts to be presented on or before June 1, 1905. The

prize was awarded to the late Reverend James Orr, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, for his treatise on "The Problem of the Old Testament," which was published in 1906 as Volume III of the Bross Library.

The second Decennial Prize of \$6,000 was offered in 1913, the competing manuscripts to be submitted by January 1, 1915. The prize was awarded by the judges to a manuscript entitled "The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels," by the Reverend Thomas James Thorburn, D.D., LL.D., St. Helen's Down, Hastings, England. This essay was published in 1916 as Volume VII of the Bross Library.

The next Bross Prize will be offered about 1925, and will be announced in due time by the Trustees of Lake Forest University.

2. The Trustees were also empowered to "select and designate any particular scientific man or Christian philosopher

and the subject on which he shall write," and to "agree with him as to the sum he shall receive for the book or treatise to be written." Under this provision the Trustees have, from time to time, invited eminent scholars to deliver courses of lectures before Lake Forest College, such courses to be subsequently published as volumes in the Bross Library. The first course of lectures, on "Obligatory Morality," was delivered in May, 1903, by the Reverend Francis Landey Patton, D.D., LL.D., then President of Princeton Theological Seminary. The copyright of these lectures is now the property of the Trustees of the Bross Fund. The second course of lectures, on "The Bible: Its Origin and Nature," was delivered in May, 1904, by the Reverend Marcus Dods, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology in New College, Edinburgh. These lectures were published in 1905 as Volume II of the Bross Library. The third course of lectures, on "The Bible of Nature," was delivered in

September and October, 1907, by Mr. J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen. These lectures were published in 1908 as Volume IV of the Bross Library. The fourth course of lectures, on "The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine," was delivered in November and December, 1908, by Frederick Jones Bliss, Ph.D., of Beirut, Syria. These lectures were published in 1912 as Volume V of the Bross Library. The fifth course of lectures, on "The Sources of Religious Insight," was delivered in November, 1911, by Professor Josiah Royce, Ph.D., of Harvard University. These lectures were published in 1912 as Volume VI of the Bross Library. The sixth course of lectures, on "The Will to Freedom, or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ," was delivered in May, 1915, by the Reverend J. Neville Figgis, D.D., Litt.D., of the House of the Resurrection, Mirfield, England. These lectures will be published as Volume



VIII of the Bross Library. The seventh course of lectures, on "Faith Justified by Progress," was delivered in April and May, 1916. These lectures are embodied in the present volume.

JOHN SCHOLTE NOLLEN,  
*President, Lake Forest College.*

LAKE FOREST, ILLINOIS,  
June, 1916.



## PREFACE

IN this essay I make no attempt to give an adequate account of the course of social evolution or to trace in detail the development of the religious consciousness. Least of all is it my purpose to take up the problem of origins, either as pertaining to social organization generally or with reference to religious belief in particular. Rather, my aim is to describe certain types of social life important enough to be regarded as leading stages in social or moral evolution, and to find out if possible the part played by religious faith in each one. The forms and features of human society to which reference is made are too well known to need illustration from sources, historical or ethnological; such citations would, in my judgment, only distract the attention of the reader

from the main interest of the essay, which is that of interpretation. A study of the functions discharged by religious faith in the leading stages of social life must, I believe, throw light upon the essential nature of religion; it will also suggest, I hope, the work which religion has still to accomplish in the advance of civilization. Such hope has been the inspiration of this writing.

HENRY WILKES WRIGHT.

LAKE FOREST, ILLINOIS,  
June 26, 1916.

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## INTRODUCTION

### THE RISE OF NATURALISM AND THE ECLIPSE OF FAITH

FAITH we shall here understand as belief that the ideals of personal life can be realized, a belief which is affirmed and acted upon in advance of proof from actual experience. Like all attempts to express in verbal formula a familiar mental state, this definition is somewhat arbitrary and will probably meet objection. To some it may seem to broaden unduly the province of faith; to others it will appear in just as unwarranted a way to restrict the range of faith's activity. A critic of the first class would undoubtedly assert that our definition so enlarged the meaning of faith as to make it identical with religion itself—and morality as well. For what, he would ask, is religion in essence but such an attitude of confidence in the

ultimate reality, confidence, that is, that the real universe provides for the final satisfaction of personality? The truth of this assertion is freely admitted, but we refuse to find in it any objection to the conception of faith which we propose to adopt. For a philosophical study of the meaning and implications of faith proves it to be this very thing, the essence of morality and of religion as well. The second objection is of opposite tenor and will come from those who are unwilling to restrict the action of faith to the moral and religious spheres. Are not, they will ask, the confidence of the business man in the economic soundness and eventual prosperity of his country and that of the ambitious youth in his own powers to achieve professional success and renown genuine cases of faith? In so far as the confidence, in these two instances and many others that might be cited from different fields of conduct, is a sincere belief in the powers of personality to ac-



comply with its purposes, they assuredly are. But in this instance, we should hold, they are but particular and partial expressions of that underlying confidence that the ends of self-conscious personality can be realized, which may rightfully claim recognition as the primary and fundamental faith.

If we thus conceive of faith as the confidence of human personality that the real world permits of its continued development and final satisfaction, it is obvious that we cannot with correctness contrast certain epochs or periods of human history as possessing faith with others as lacking it. Without some measure of confidence in the power of his own will to accomplish its proper purposes, man could not continue to exist at all; certainly no social order could survive and make its contribution to human civilization. But the confidence in question may be more explicitly avowed and constantly reflected on in one age than in another. So in historic fact it was in the Middle Ages; hence not

inappropriately the mediæval period has been called the age of faith. The absorbing intellectual interest of this period was human salvation, the preservation of man's soul in its essence and integrity from all the corrupting and destroying influences of the material world. Such conservation of human personality, despaired of in the deepening gloom that attended the close of the ancient era, mediæval thought confidently and joyfully believed had been secured through the divine plan of redemption. This divine redemptive plan became consequently the ceaseless preoccupation of men's minds in this period; it was for them the one end toward which the whole creation moved. With reference to this one end of man's salvation through the divine redemptive process, they interpreted all the facts of human experience. The one purpose of their thinking was to formulate, clearly and exhaustively, the Christian plan of salvation, and then to discover how the events of human history

and the objects and creatures of the material world contributed as means to the furtherance of this sublime end. Thus in dealing with natural phenomena, it knew but one method of interpretation, the teleological: the existence of objects was explained by showing the moral or religious purpose they subserved. To undertake such a detailed description and classification of existing objects as constitutes the foundation of modern science, it had not the slightest inclination; it had little or no interest in the natural world for its own sake or in the relation of natural objects among themselves. Hence the thought of this period sought to explain the existence of objects, not by showing their natural causes, but by searching out the uses which they had for man, and particularly their value for man's spiritual edification. And when by no effort of the imagination it was possible to connect an object or event with the divine plan for human salvation, it was treated

as a symbol, a divinely prepared lesson of spiritual truth. To the natural world apart from these supposed spiritual uses the mediæval attitude was one of disdainful indifference: it was not worth the time and trouble required for its patient and thorough study. Little wonder that modern science has shown an antagonism to such teleology so bitter and relentless as to seem, in this day of general toleration unreasonable! Teleology of this kind represents not merely a method different from, and opposed to, the causal investigation of nature; it represents the depreciation and denial of all natural science whatsoever.

In the course of time, mediæval thought developed a fairly complete world-view. This world-view was borrowed from several sources, its constituent features being selected because of their harmony with the ruling preconception of the period. Its cosmogony was derived from a literal interpretation of the first chapters of Gene-

sis. The world was created by God out of nothing in six literal days, designed by the divine will to be the home of man, and every other living thing was also separately created and likewise designed to serve him who bore God's image. Its astronomy was taken from the ancient system of Ptolemy. The earth was the centre of the universe: the heavenly bodies, sun, moon, and stars, revolved round the earth, giving man the heat and light he needed by day and by night. The physics of Aristotle was admirably suited to complete this conception of the physical universe. The earth was the seat of imperfect motion, hence the scene of change and decay. Motion becomes less variable and more perfect as the spheres succeed one another until the outermost is reached, where motion is perfect and eternally the same. This outermost sphere is the heaven of heavens, the abode of deity. This world-scheme of the mediæval mind, had two striking merits: it agreed both with the demands of man's

spiritual welfare as he then understood them and also with the facts as they appeared to sense-perception.

The modern world has largely lost that faith which possessed and inspired the mediæval mind. Our loss of faith is to a considerable extent due to the fact that the advance of knowledge has compelled modern thought to abandon the mediæval world-view. Modern science has given us in its place the universe of natural law, a universe in which it is far more difficult to find any provision for man's continued personal development and ultimate salvation. In the formation of the modern scientific world-view the first and perhaps the most important step was the discovery by Copernicus that the sun and not the earth was the centre of the solar system, that the earth was, in fact, but one of a number of satellites, moving around the sun and revolving upon its own axis as well. We have become so familiar with these ideas, the very A B C of astronomical

science, that we may altogether fail to appreciate their revolutionary import for human thought. We cannot understand why they aroused such a fury of opposition among churchmen, Catholic and Protestant alike. But when once we grasp the significance of the change which the Copernican astronomy wrought in man's conception of his world we no longer wonder that the Church combated it with such unrestrained violence, with such desperate earnestness; for the belief that man's salvation through the divinely appointed plan is the end for which the whole world exists seems to require as its logical consequence the further belief that the earth, the stage on which this tremendous drama of man's fall and redemption is enacted, is the centre of the universe. Everything else, the whole choir of heaven, sun, moon, and stars, is reduced to the position of mere stage-setting, is made accessory and subsidiary to human concerns. But what a different position does modern astronomy assign to the earth

in relation to the rest of the physical universe! It has not even the importance of a star; it is only a satellite of what Lafcadio Hearn calls a "tenth-rate yellow sun," a sun like which there are countless others among the host of stars. Such then is the home of man, and the race of man itself but a swarm of living beings inhabiting the surface of such a planet as it swings on its orbit; his position in the universal system is thus one of utter insignificance. Ought we then to feel surprise when we read that in 1631 a Roman Catholic prelate declared: "The opinion of the earth's motion is of all heresies the most abominable, the most pernicious, the most scandalous; the immutability of the earth is thrice sacred; argument against the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and the incarnation should be tolerated sooner than an argument that the earth moves"? The world of mediæval thought was a world small enough for man to feel at home in. If not itself man's spiritual home, it



was so arranged as to enable man to get his spiritual bearings: for was not heaven itself located at the outermost stellar sphere? The world of modern astronomy is a lonesome, an awesome, an inhuman sort of place where are furnaces of heat so intense that one faint breath would suffice to consume every living creature of earth, and frozen solitudes immeasurably vast through which go hurtling masses of matter able on collision to shatter our earth to dust. In such a universe, infinitely extended in space and time, man's life, the whole course of his history upon earth seems but the merest flicker destined to leave, even in the place of its occurrence, scarcely a trace.

Soon after Copernicus made his startling discovery that the earth moves around the sun, Kepler discovered that the distribution and orbits of the planets agree with the forms and principles of geometry, showing that the path of planetary revolution is an ellipse and that the laws of plane-

tary motion are based upon this figure. This remarkable demonstration that the physical world was ordered in definite quantitative relations served both to establish the Copernican astronomy and to add one more stone to the foundation of the modern mechanical world-view. In the seventeenth century Newton completed the work of Kepler by showing that the direction and velocity of planetary motion were instances of a still more fundamental quantitative uniformity which held of all motion of all bodies in the physical world. Thus it was the privilege of Newton, working in ground already prepared by Galileo, to complete the foundations of modern physics; for the verification of the gravitation formula that every particle or atom or body in the universe attracts every other with a force proportional to their masses taken conjointly, and inversely proportional to the square of their distances apart, meant that the mechanical laws which hold good on the surface of the

earth were valid throughout the universe; that, in short, the physical universe was a huge machine.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, attempts were being made to complete the mechanical world-system which had been so rapidly and securely established. To accomplish this it was necessary to explain the origin of the natural world by the same mechanical principles that were shown to control its operation, and to account for the birth and development of life and of mind in terms of mechanical causation. This the philosopher Kant attempted to do. Being desirous of proving that the divine interference which Newton believed was required to account for the origin of the world-machine could be dispensed with, Kant in an early work, *The General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), tried to show that the origin of the physical universe could be explained according to mechanical law, and, to this end, formulated a theory of

world-origin which anticipates in a remarkable fashion the essential features of the nebular hypothesis, later proposed by Laplace and generally adopted. In other works which also fall within the earlier period of his intellectual career, Kant endeavored to explain the origin, growth, and differentiation of living beings by natural causes, holding that all higher forms may be traced back to simpler elementary forms, and that present differences in species are due to the direct influence of changing external conditions, such as climate, food, etc. Not even man would he exempt from the mechanical system, but he proposed to account for his origin and development by the same natural causes. Kant's attempt thus to make mechanism universal proved to be premature, however; he himself abandoned it and withdrew to a more conservative position in later life. Over-zealous partisans of natural science have attributed Kant's abandonment of his earlier evolutionism to the conservatism of

advancing age reinforced by a reluctance to break completely with the traditional theology. But such charges are quite unjustified; the reasons which determined Kant thus to change his view were the very same which influenced great naturalists like Buffon in the closing decade of the eighteenth century to abandon all belief in organic evolution and hold fast to special creation. These reasons were furnished by the forms and structures of the living organism itself, as those were at that time being discovered and described through microscopical investigation and systematic research. Such scientific study served only to set in clearer light the marvellous adaptations characteristic of life and living creatures, adaptations of species to their environment, and of organs and structures to their function and use. To account for such beautifully contrived, for such finely adjusted structures, no natural cause sufficed; before them mechanism was dumb; outside the province of physical law they

seemed destined to remain, as living witnesses to the contriving skill of divine intelligence. To such a compromise Kant finally came: the inorganic world he believed capable of thoroughgoing mechanical formulation, but the organic world, he thought, could be explained only in terms of creative purpose.

Nearly a century elapsed before Darwin, master-mind of the nineteenth century, as Kant was of the eighteenth, removed this last great obstacle to the extension of natural law by bringing the realm of life within the domain of physical causation. Darwin's achievement was twofold. In the first place, he assembled and arranged a mass of evidence, in cumulative effect fairly convincing, that the different forms of life now existent owe their origin not to so many creative acts of Deity but to a natural process of development. Secondly, he made the discovery, of which Kant despaired, of a natural cause or process able to account for the existence of

those organic structures which, because plainly adapted as means to the fulfilment of an end, we are naturally disposed to refer to the work of a designing intelligence. Of these two achievements perhaps the second was the more notable; for, until a natural cause could be imagined and verified able to produce these purposive structures, human thought would be justified in holding to an exclusively teleological explanation of their origin. But, as we are aware, Darwin showed that, given the constant occurrence in living forms of minute variations that are inherited, then, in the struggle to exist which follows from the rapid rate of multiplication of such living beings, those variations which best fit the organism to live and prosper in its environment will be preserved and transmitted, while all others will be eliminated. As the result of these causes, variations are accumulated along those lines which adapt the organism to exist and survive; thus, gradually, the complicated adapta-

tions of living tissue, at which we marvel, take their rise. Of late years there has been some talk among scientists of the decline and even of the "death" of "Darwinism," and from this some anxious spirits have derived consolation, thinking that it means the abandonment by science of the evolution theory. But when such statements are made by persons competent to judge, the Darwinism referred to is the view that natural selection is the all-sufficient cause of organic evolution. This latter was not even the view of Darwin himself, but of some of his followers, particularly those influenced by Wallace and Weismann. Darwin in later years came more and more to doubt the adequacy of natural selection to explain all the facts, and found himself assigning a constantly increasing importance to such other factors as use and disuse and the direct action of the environment. In a letter written late in life he confesses with characteristic candor to his chagrin over this



fact because it diminished the credit due to natural selection, the factor which he had discovered and which was destined to be identified forever with his name.

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the scientific world-view in its main outlines completed. The natural sciences, brought into correlation by the comprehensive principle of evolution, conceived of the universe as a system whose parts are determined not by an overruling intelligence but by resident forces which act and react with mechanical uniformity. As this world-view gained influence over men's minds and won increasing acceptance in intelligent circles of modern society, it weakened faith and threatened to destroy it altogether; for such a universe as evolutionary science depicted seemed itself to demonstrate the futility of faith. Belief that the ideals of personal life can be realized is rational only if such realization is a possibility. But man's personal development requires that he be able to

choose his ideal, to plan the steps in its realization, to subject natural objects and forces to the achievement of his purpose, and finally to experience the satisfaction of its realization. This in its turn implies, on man's side, freedom, initiative, and personal permanence; on the side of nature, the capacity to respond to new forces and to enter into new relations. But how is this possible in a mechanically determined system? The same machinery which in its regular workings struck off the spark of man's soul must in a short time extinguish it, and that little corner of the universe which for a brief while knew man and his busy pretensions would know him no more. This effect of modern naturalism in destroying man's faith in his own personal ideals and his own spiritual destiny, Huxley describes in a passage become classic: "The consciousness of this great truth" ("the extension of matter and causation and the concomitant banishment of spirit and spontaneity") "weighs

like a nightmare upon many of the best minds of these days. They watch what they conceive to be the progress of materialism in such fear and powerless anger as a savage feels when during an eclipse the great shadow creeps over the face of the sun. The advancing tide of matter threatens to drown their souls, the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom."

Modern philosophy, however, has found new grounds for the faith which the advancing shadow of naturalism threatened totally to eclipse, and these grounds lie in the method and presuppositions of experimental science itself. It was then no accident that turned the attention of philosophers in modern times to the processes and problems of knowledge: the facts of epistemology were just the counterbalance needed to offset the sweeping conclusions of science and prepare the way for a truly synthetic view. These epistemological studies of early modern philosophers cul-

minated in the epoch-making insight of the philosopher Kant which brought about what he liked to call a Copernican revolution in the science of knowledge. Now Kant was not only a student of philosophical problems; he was well versed in modern science and had given special attention to the Newtonian mechanics. Newton's system made a deep impression upon him: from its study he gained that insight which is fundamental to his system; for Kant was the first to apprehend in its real significance the fact that the sciences of mathematics and physics are not accumulations of sense-facts, but instead are genuine intellectual constructions, as truly creations of the mind of the scientist as a national policy or an epic poem are creations of the mind of statesman or poet. In order to bring out the importance of this fundamental insight of Kant's we must at this juncture advert to certain considerations which digress slightly from the main line of our thought.

Every view or conception of the world, including, of course, the mechanical, which pretends to be universal in its scope, must furnish explanation for its own existence as a system of thought. For the human thinker and his thought are a part of the real world and one who would explain the universe in terms of mechanism must find mechanical causes and processes able to account for them both. Now if, for the moment, the graver difficulty be ignored of introducing consciousness into the system of physical energy, we may admit that we should have at least the semblance of a mechanical explanation of thinking if we could conceive of, say, scientific generalization as the accumulation of impressions of a certain kind, made upon the mind by a particular object or set of objects, event or sequence of events, which repeatedly stimulated the sense-organs. Thus we should have at least the suggestion of an explanation of thinking in terms of natural causation. Now, this is the

way in which many persons, and frequently the scientific investigators themselves who are actively engaged in the process, tend to understand scientific induction. From the observation of similar instances and an accumulation of particular facts, the generalization is supposed to arise by a kind of natural law. Bacon, the reputed founder of the inductive method, may seem occasionally to give sanction to this view, but Galileo had a more adequate understanding of the process. The truth is that a scientific induction is a creation of active intelligence: the laws induced are not conscious reflections of the total effect of many external agencies working upon the sense-organs, they are in a true sense original constructions of the mind itself. Working on the basis of observed fact, the scientific investigator by the exercise of his constructive imagination formulates an hypothesis, and this he is able to do because of the power his mind possesses of projecting motions and con-

ceiving relations in pure space, independent of actual observation. The hypothesis once constructed, the intelligence of the originator, guided by its intuitive grasp of the logic of space and of meaning, proceeds to deduce the particular consequences which will follow in fact if the hypothesis is true. In this fashion all the great inductions of modern science, those of Copernicus and Kepler, of Galileo and Newton and Darwin, have arisen; as such they are standing refutations of the mechanical conception of the universe.

Kant rendered modern thought a high service, therefore, when he showed that the laws of natural science are intellectual constructions, that mathematics and physics in particular are not assemblages of facts but elaborately wrought-out conceptual systems. But, we are tempted at once to ask, do we not, when we thus speak of the laws of nature as constructions of imaginative intelligence, neglect their distinguishing feature, their outstanding char-

acteristic? We are familiar with the products of the imagination in other fields. The novelist, for example, through the exercise of his imagination creates a group of characters, fills in every important detail of their appearance, dress, and situation, records every significant act and incident of their life histories, and all with such consistency and lifelikeness that we say his story is truer than fact. For all that, because the story is a work of imagination and not a narration of actual occurrences, we assign it to the realm of fiction rather than the domain of fact. On the other hand, is not the salient feature of a scientific law its standing as objective fact, in diametrical opposition to all that is subjective and fictitious? Does it not express a uniformity in the operation of real forces, an underlying uniformity and hence a basal fact? The question arises, then, how such a generalization, admittedly the creation of human intelligence, acquires the standing of objective fact. This



was Kant's great problem. His solution was that such principles and products of our thinking gain objectivity from the work they do in making more orderly, more harmonious, more unified, the world of our common human experience. For, he held, the difference between the objective world and any realm of fiction or of fancy is that the elements of the former are so bound together in fixed order and relationship as to constitute one system, the same for all human minds.

Kant's answer is undoubtedly true as far as it goes, profoundly and indubitably true. Many of the products of our thinking, generalizations of intelligence or constructions of the imagination as they may be called, do acquire the standing of objective fact in just this way: they agree with, and correlate, a number of different instances; they harmonize many discrepant and conflicting facts; they unify and reduce to system a mass of unrelated and hence bewildering data. This is what oc-

curs in the every-day life of all of us. Suppose that I enter my classroom one morning and instead of the order, neatness, and warmth which I expected to find, am disconcerted to feel a rushing draft of cold air, to see a jagged hole in an upper window-pane, and to observe muddy footprints on the floor. For the moment, I stand perplexed, trying to imagine some explanation. Then I remember that I saw some boys engaged in a ball game just outside the window on the previous afternoon, and wonder if their ball did the damage. I notice that the window broken is on the side of the room toward their playground, that the hole in the glass is about the size a ball would make, and that the mud or dust upon the floor is such as they would leave if they had entered and searched the room for their ball. I thereupon accept my hypothesis as true in fact, and do so because it agrees with and correlates all the data present to my senses. When I adopt such an hypothesis as

truth, moreover, it does not remain something distinct from and added to the empirical facts; it merges with and becomes part of these facts. The broken window now becomes the window broken by the ball, and the muddy footmarks the footmarks of the boys. Thus do fact and theory merge in the constitution of our real world. In exactly the same way are many scientific postulates verified: they are accepted as true because, better than any other beliefs, they agree with the many variant and apparently conflicting facts in a certain field, and reduce them to order and system. On this ground the theory of evolution has been accepted by scientists: it was Darwin's achievement to have assembled the facts and then to have shown that the evolutionary hypothesis was the only generalization sufficiently comprehensive to correlate them all.

Kant then discovered one of the ways in which our intellectual constructions are verified and given standing as facts. But

this was, after all, but one method of verification and hence furnished only a partial solution of the problem. And when a partial truth is taken for the whole, in any field, the outcome is bound to be serious error. This is what occurred in the development of Kant's philosophy, and particularly in the thought of his immediate successors of the German idealistic school. Kant made it plain that the laws of natural science are hypotheses which owe their objective reality to the work they do—but this work, as he thought, was wholly intellectual, the organization of the data of experience into an ideal, a conceptual, system. Now his followers Fichte, Schelling, and particularly Hegel, went on, as they believed, to develop the logical implications of his standpoint. Since the work of thought is thus to organize the data of experience, the ultimate aim of all thinking, or Truth, is necessarily a completed intellectual system, a system of ideas which shall comprehend and make

place for every detail of experience. Since, furthermore, our thought gains objectivity according as it furthers the organization of conscious experience, it follows, so these thinkers maintained, that a completed intellectual synthesis, such as we understand Truth to be, is also identical with the fullest, the most complete Reality. Now, it is obvious that such an ideal unity has been achieved in no human experience, and if we believe, as the successors of Kant did believe, that the existence of such a completely organized experience is implied in the efforts of our intelligence to organize the data of our experience, we must suppose that it takes the form of a superhuman experience, an Absolute Thought, in which all the details of our conscious lives, fragmentary and conflicting as they appear to be, are comprehended and reconciled. And, as by the exercise of our thought we continue to unify and systematize the details of our limited experience, in an increasing degree we partic-

ipate in the Absolute Experience and share its perfect reality.

In this way Kant's theory of knowledge was transformed into an intellectualistic philosophy. For it is plainly a consequence of this reasoning that man as a finite being attains fuller reality not by endeavor of action to transform the actual conditions of his existence, but by effort of thought to see things as they are, all comprehended and reconciled within the one absolute system. This position, once taken, has further consequences repugnant to our moral consciousness—consequences which led finally to the rejection of absolute idealism and, unfortunately, to the partial discrediting of the Kantian principles underlying it. If reality attaches only to that which is embraced within the unity of the Absolute Experience, what becomes of the inconsistencies, the discordant and conflicting features of our human experience? They must be regarded as apparent, not real, as illusions

due to our imperfect understanding, certain to disappear when we attain the larger vision. The difficulties in such a view come home to us with special force in two vitally important connections. In the first place, the independence and initiative of individual human wills seem to violate that perfected unity of the absolute thought and to produce persistent opposition and open conflict in the world of real fact. Secondly, evil seems to be rooted in a radical maladjustment in the nature of things. Now, the absolute idealist, if true to his principle, is bound to regard both human freedom and the different forms of evil as illusory and unreal: in so far as the human individual attains reality, he is merged in the Absolute Experience, and to such a one, who sees things as they are, all that appears to be evil proves to be a means to a larger good. Such a view discourages effort and belittles moral struggle; it is repugnant to the conscience of the modern world.

Thus a check was given to the growth of a new humanism existing in germ in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a humanism which sees the laws of natural science in their true character as working hypotheses, as plans for human action accepted on faith and tested by the help they give man in enlarging the sphere of his conscious control. Kant himself assisted in concealing these humanistic implications of his thought when he made the test of these working principles exclusively intellectual. This led his successors finally to conceive of them as principles resident in the world for thought to discover rather than as tools or instruments employed by man's will in its effort to control and transform the world, tested by the aid they supply in this undertaking, and replaced by other principles when these prove more efficient. To conceive of the laws of nature as uniformities of relation required to maintain the coherence and completeness of the Absolute



Thought is to substitute for a physical, a logical, determinism, just as fatal to man's freedom and opportunity for personal development as the most thorough-going materialism.

Further knowledge, both of the interdependence of thought and action and of scientific methods of verification, was required before the momentous consequences of Kant's Copernican change of position in philosophy could be rightly understood and appreciated. Nearly a century elapsed before this knowledge had been gained, and it remained for an American school of philosophy to prove conclusively that all belief, in science as well as in religion, depended upon practice for its verification. The genius of William James, co-operating with the incisive thought of John Dewey, developed a doctrine well known as Pragmatism, which is destined to stand as a permanent contribution to the solution of philosophic problems. Two facts deeply impressed the minds of these original prag-

matists and suggested their famous doctrine: the discovery by genetic psychology that in organic evolution intelligence has been developed as an aid to action, a means of adjustment, and the general recognition by working scientists that their so-called laws are not transcriptions of reality but man-made instruments whose use is to correlate old facts and lead to new ones. These and other facts seemed to the founders of pragmatism to justify the general conclusion that the test of truth is always success in practice, that those ideas are true which, when acted upon, lead us to the results we expect and desire. Other verification than this, they maintained, there is none: there is no significant difference for thought which does not make a difference in action. A practical difficulty, a situation to which no habitual response is adequate, furnishes the occasion for thought; the solution of this difficulty constitutes its validation. For this doctrine that all thought takes the

form of belief, which looks forward to the results of action to be verified, the pragmatists found ample confirmation in all the leading departments of human experience: in the ordinary conduct of daily life, in religious faith, in scientific procedure. The truth of my belief that this road leads to the lake is ascertained by walking down it and observing where it comes out. The truth of my belief that this fabric is fast color is found out when, on wearing it, I expose it to the sun and rain. In religion, whose hypotheses are not subject to the usual tests of experience, beliefs are tested by their effects (primarily emotional) upon the mind of the believer: do they give him the hope and courage to struggle on in pursuit of his ideals, or the resignation and fortitude required to enable him to endure his trials and disappointments? By their "fruits," not by their "roots" we should know them, said James of religious beliefs. In science the true theory is the theory which enables

the investigator to predict what will happen when, under laboratory conditions, natural processes are allowed to take their course. The belief that water is composed of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen is verified when in the chemical laboratory a combination of these elements in this proportion is observed to result in the familiar substance.

The doctrine of pragmatism made an instant appeal to popular intelligence—in particular to minds which were seeking a new basis for religious faith in the world of modern science. The popular vogue of pragmatism was largely due to the simplicity, the clearness, and the practicality of its cardinal principle, presenting such a striking contrast to the labored argument and technical subtlety of traditional metaphysics. But, as the case is bound to be with apparently simple, sun-clear, and open-air philosophies, when pragmatism was interpreted, amended, and elaborated to meet a flood of hostile criticism it became

as complicated and abstruse as any highly wrought product of the philosopher's study. Two of the criticisms directed against the pragmatist doctrine have especial interest for us: one concerns the fields in which ideas "work"; the other has to do with the character of the result which gives verification to our ideas when they are acted upon. With reference to the first point critics at once maintained, and the pragmatists acknowledged the force of their argument, that ideas work intellectually as well as in the field of action. One of the leading functions of ideas is to correlate other ideas; beliefs and conceptions are accepted as true because they reduce to order and system many previous judgments which, as they stand, are not merely different but contradictory. On these grounds, as we have seen in reviewing Kant's theory, many of the generalizations of natural science are adopted as true. In its original statement, indeed, pragmatism tended to be as one-sided in its

emphasis upon the adjustment of acts as the Kantian theory was in its preoccupation with intellectual synthesis. Upon the second point, hostile criticism maintained that the outcome which was supposed by pragmatism to establish the truth of the belief which guided the action could not be the pleasure or satisfaction of the individual agent, nor even his material comfort and prosperity; for these results are frequently obtained by individuals who are acting upon beliefs generally admitted to be false, while conversely many an idea which the experience of humanity proves to be true has brought to the individual who acted under its guidance only disappointment and poverty and misery. Many persons, for instance, have achieved material prosperity, have accumulated fortunes, by acting upon the belief that every man has his price and that one must outwit his fellows if he does not wish to have them outwit him—but such results do not prove the truth of the

belief in question. No, the true idea is the idea which works "in the long run," and when we take the long run into consideration we have to acknowledge the underlying identity of all human interests and say that truth belongs to those beliefs which, when taken for guides of action, contribute to the ultimate good of humanity. This pragmatists have been loath to admit, but it is impossible to see how, if they do not, their theory of knowledge escapes individualism and subjectivism. Unless amended in some such way, it is little better than the teachings of the ancient Sophists; it makes such beliefs true as the individual finds it advantageous to hold.

It is evident, therefore, that if practical success be adopted as the criterion of truth, practice cannot be understood as meaning mere outward action, the adjustment of the living individual to his natural environment. It must be interpreted in a larger sense as identical with

all voluntary action, all purposive activity. If it is thus understood there is no conceivable ground for excluding the fields of thought and emotion from its territory: surely both intellectual and æsthetic activity may be purposive, voluntary; truth and beauty may be ends sought by will, as well as prosperity and efficiency. It must be identified with the satisfaction of human personality in its universal aspect. It means the realization of the personal capacities of every human individual, means the fullest personal development of humanity. To such a pragmatism as this the ethical idealist should have no objection: to be sure, it subordinates truth to the ultimate moral purpose of the world, but such purpose the idealist takes to be the ground of all existence whatsoever.

This new humanism which modern philosophy offers us, able to restore our confidence in the powers of personality so badly shaken by the great wave of nat-



uralism which followed the extension of the scientific world-view, is thus a synthesis of critical idealism and pragmatism. It recognizes *will* as fundamental to human personality, as the root of human activity, the source of human progress. Thought, then, is a particular expression, a specialized function of will. All ideas are originally programmes of action which look forward to conduct for fulfilment and realization. Hence all beliefs are originally postulates, and faith is prior to fact; for ideas must first be adopted and acted upon before they can be established as facts. The fields of conduct in which ideas are thus tested are those of thought itself, of action, and of feeling; in these three departments of his life, intellectual, technical, and æsthetic, man is pursuing his personal ideals and, through the outcome of this activity, is receiving the judgment of reality upon his beliefs. The result which certifies the truth of a belief is the same in these three fields of prac-

tice—extension of the sphere of man's conscious control, enlargement of the content of his personal life.

Such is the view which underlies the interpretation of human progress to be given in these lectures. The types of belief, or forms of faith, both scientific and religious, which characterize each of the main stages in man's social evolution will be considered in their relations of dependence and development. Thus we shall permit the course of progress itself to speak concerning the validity of the great determining beliefs of human history. But before beginning this survey, we must pause for a brief consideration of the nature and workings of the human will, the source of man's personal power, and of his social progress.

## CHAPTER I

### THE WILL AS THE TRUE SOURCE OF HUMAN PROGRESS

WILL is an activity which, like life itself, is so pervasive, so many-sided, so incalculable, as to resist definition, since to define we must make distinctions and set limits. In attempts to characterize will, one is most likely to err through emphasizing one of its two leading aspects at the expense of the other. Some investigators concern themselves altogether with the influence of will upon outward action; they conceive it as a control or co-ordination of bodily movement. This conception of volition primarily in terms of organic behavior suggests an explanation of voluntary action in terms of mechanical causation, and leads to a neglect of that

other most notable and distinctive feature of volition, the ability to choose between ends and to originate courses of activity. Absorption in this second, the "spiritual" side of voluntary activity leads, on its part, to a conception of the will equally abstract. Impressed by the fact that will is free from the shackles of natural causation, that its activities are in some sense self-caused, moralists have often been led to an empty and negative conception of will, as essentially characterized by its lack of any determination whatsoever.

If we would understand the character of will as an actually existing power of human nature, we must for the moment turn away both from the principles of biology and the metaphysics of freedom, and look directly at it as it operates in the conduct of man, both in the evolution of human society and in our own choices and pursuits. This we shall, of course, be doing when we review the principal stages in man's social development, but

a preliminary statement will be useful in clearing the ground for this survey. When we thus look directly at the workings of will in our experience we find it acting in two capacities. We find, first, that it is a factor in the physical world of bodies and of motion, that it directs the movements of the physical organism which it inhabits, and in consequence determines the movements of other bodies both living and non-living. Through the instrumentality of his physical organism, man combines the materials and harnesses the forces of nature: thus he builds habitations and conveyances, fashions tools and weapons, constructs machines; he also assembles other human individuals for purposes of intercourse, industry, war, and government. But all these actions he performs as a means to the attainment of ends, that is, personal satisfactions. Thus we find will acting in a second capacity quite different from the first: that of choosing between different objects in accordance

with their value as ends. Now, these objects which are chosen as sources of personal satisfaction differ in many ways, notably in their degree of comprehensiveness. Some are specific and temporary, such as an article of food desired at any particular moment; others are more general and lasting, such as wealth or family prestige; others are still more inclusive, such as national welfare or the knowledge of truth. But whenever will is exercised continuously and is thus given opportunity for self-expression, we find it selecting and seeking the most comprehensive ends, those ends which include the largest number of particular satisfactions and promise to produce the fullest and richest personal life. Thus, will, viewed in the light of human history and experience, appears as a power constantly striving so to control the forces of nature and to adjust the tendencies of social life as to bring about the most comprehensive satisfaction of human personality.

When we consider the abilities which are prerequisite to the operation of will, a voluntary action seems a notable achievement. So, in fact, it is; among living creatures only man is, as far as we know, capable of volition. Yet any child of three or four years, of sufficient mental development to have a desire and to seek its fulfilment, possesses this power. Indeed, a simple act of volition, such as any child is capable of, may illustrate in an effective way the different factors which co-operate in all voluntary activity.

Suppose that a child of four, tired of play outdoors, comes into the house. The room which he enters contains familiar toys which excite the play impulse in him, and packages as yet unopened which awaken his instinctive curiosity. This pressure of instinct and impulse he is able to resist, however, because a definite desire has seized him. In obedience to this desire he, disregarding everything else, walks straight across the room to his

mother's side and asks her to tell him a story, a new story with soldiers in it (for he has just seen soldiers passing). When she demurs he continues to urge; finally, he gains her consent and sits down satisfied by the prospect of the coming tale.

In such a case of action from desire we have a simple instance of that voluntary activity which is the root and source of all personal life. For the child who thus acts from conscious desire refuses longer to permit nature, in the form of inborn instinct and involuntary impulse, to act through him; he asserts his right as a free being to determine his own action as his intelligence approves. Now, even in our example, which illustrates will at the earliest stage of its development and consequently in its simplest form, we can distinguish in the operation of willing or volition three factors.

The first of these is *thought* and *imagination*. The boy imagines his mother telling him a story, and this, his idea of something



which does not yet exist, sets itself in sharp contrast to objects actually present to his senses, such as toys or books. Unless the human individual is able to conceive or imagine objects not yet existent, he will be unable through his own initiative to realize such objects. The idea itself, the imagined story-telling, that is, is the outcome of previous experience, of memories of stories asked for, told, and enjoyed. But in thought past experience is not merely revived and opposed to present fact; it is taken to pieces, altered, recombined. Thus, the story asked for need not be identical with the one last told, but may be a new one whose subject had been suggested by that day's play. Thought, reinterpreting rather than reproducing past experience, gives expression to the unitary self or personality which is developing throughout the course of such experience.

The second factor is *feeling*. Because he has enjoyed the stories told him in the

past the child finds the idea of listening to a story very pleasant. But while the story told him remains merely an idea, it conflicts with the actual facts. This conflict between what is wished for and what actually exists produces strain and tension in the child's consciousness, which is felt as painful. When he wins the desired consent, however, and the story begins, he feels pleasure in "getting his wish," thus removing from his mind the conflict between idea and actual fact. Feeling reflects the effect upon the self of seeking and attaining new objects.

*Action* is the third factor. Moved by the idea of the story which he desires but does not hear, the child takes steps which, he believes, will bring the longed-for result. He intercedes with his mother in the manner which promises to be most effective, meeting objections with the best replies he can devise, until at last the result is gained. In action, the individual grapples with the actual situation, and so

transforms it as to provide for the realization of his idea.

But while thought, feeling, and action are all essential to the operation of volition, in none of them do we find its essential quality revealed. No one of them may be said to determine the will; for, in the first place, volition is more than the execution of a programme thought out beforehand in every detail. It is impossible through thought to foresee the actual course of events at every point. No amount of thinking—even if he possessed all the wisdom of his elders—would assure the boy of our illustration of his mother's consent, or anticipate her every objection. Then, secondly, volition is more than the resultant of feelings produced by past experience and influencing present conduct, for the pleasures of the past have all of them arisen from special situations, and the past guarantees their repetition only when the situation itself is reproduced. But our wills are always facing

new situations whose pleasure-giving possibilities are uncertain. If it is not a new story that the child wishes for, it is an old story on a new occasion and the enjoyment it will furnish can only be ascertained by trying it. Finally, volition is more than the outcome of action. To attain such result as the circumstances permit, in the most skilful manner possible, is not to exercise volition. A result must be gained in order to satisfy the will, surely—but it must be such a result as appeals to the doer because of his own personal experience and, for this reason, such a result as satisfies *himself*. To be able to persuade his mother to tell the story will not satisfy the will of the boy unless, because of his own experience, he has come to enjoy story-telling.

The true nature of will is revealed only when we understand it as embracing thought, feeling, and action equally, not merely assembled as parts, but merged by their co-operation into a vital unity. We

discover the essential quality of volition when we think of it as an activity which is ever striving, through a variety of chosen objects, toward a general end or result, and this result is self-expansion, the expansion of the boundaries of conscious life until it shall include and assimilate everything that is real. Will is, therefore, the cause of all our human development, being both the demand which we as intelligent persons make for more life and a larger world and also the power to attain such life and to realize such a world. Subjectively, it manifests itself as the capacity for *faith*, belief in the ability of conscious personality ultimately to master and absorb all that exists, and thus gain for itself permanence and reality. Such faith does not contradict reason or disregard fact; it is based upon reason and utilizes such facts as a rational interpretation of past experience furnishes. But it refuses to be limited by past experience; it proposes to discover new facts that

shall enlarge the scope and enrich the content of personal life. Objectively, it appears as the ability to *venture*, the willingness to abandon objects already attained and proved satisfactory for the sake of other objects as yet unattained and uncertain, which promise larger possibilities of satisfaction. This venturing is not the foolhardiness which contemptuously flings aside hard-won and certain goods in the pursuit of objects whose promises are alluring but deceptive; it is rather that true courage which dares to jeopardize the limited although secure satisfaction of the present in a deliberate and strenuous attempt to attain new objects which, in the larger life they involve, make permanent place for, and impart new significance to, the satisfactions at the time surrendered. Even in our trivial instance we find the essential character of volition illustrated. The child resists the appeal of surrounding objects to his senses and asks for a story because his germinating

personality demands expansion in an object which shall express himself. He shows faith, for he believes in what no wisdom, human or divine, could predict for a certainty—that his mother can be persuaded to tell the story. He is able to venture, for he gives up the assured pleasure which his toys would furnish in order to seek an object which, although it contained larger possibilities of self-satisfaction, was at the time remote and uncertain.

It is this activity of volition, maintaining faith in the power and permanence of personality, and daring to venture for the sake of a fuller life and a larger world, which is the true cause of all man's progress. In the pages which follow we shall see it determining the successive stages of human development.

“We cannot kindle when we will  
The fire which in the heart resides;  
The spirit bloweth and is still,  
In mystery our soul abides.  
But tasks in hours of insight will'd  
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled.

“With aching hands and bleeding feet  
We dig and heap, lay stone on stone;  
We bear the burden and the heat  
Of the long day, and wish ’twere done.  
Not till the hours of light return,  
All we have built do we discern.”  
(Arnold : “*Morality.*”)



## CHAPTER II

### THE PRIMITIVE LIFE

THE simplest and lowest type of human life is that absorbed in the gratification of momentary desire. At the dawn of its development man's will finds expression in the pursuit of objects which attract it by the pleasure they promise at the very moment. This type of life, given over to the pursuit of present pleasure, may therefore be taken as the initial step in human progress.

In thus distinguishing a kind of human life entirely given to the gratification of present desire, we are by no means asserting that men or groups of men have ever lived so preoccupied with present pleasure as never in the whole course of their existence to have had a single thought for the future or its hazards. This may well be doubted, for the instinct

of self-preservation would prompt men to seek escape from future pain as soon as the first ray of self-conscious intelligence had appeared. But it is also true that races or tribes of men do exist and have existed whose life is, in the main, a pursuit of the objects of momentary desire. With the advance of civilization such groups become rarer; their life is of necessity savage and nomadic, and possible only under exceptionally favorable conditions. These conditions are actually realized in some equatorial regions and tropical isles where neither clothing nor shelter is required for the preservation of existence, and abundance of food is ready at hand. So situated, men can live and do live without serious thought for the morrow, absorbed in the enjoyment now of food, now of play, now of rest, now of companionship, combat, and sexual or parental love. Then, among more civilized peoples are individuals whose lives rarely rise above this first low plane of attainment—

only here the social environment does not usually permit the uninterrupted indulgence of present desire, even if it were otherwise possible. We all know of individuals whose momentary desires are so strong and whose power of realizing future consequences is so weak that they are unable for long to keep out of the clutches of the law. Still further, even among the most civilized of men, persons whose lives are for the most part thoroughly regulated have periods of moral relaxation in which they seem incapable of doing more than following momentary impulse: we all demand, as William James puts it, our "moral holidays." This type of life, devoted to the quest of present pleasure, constitutes the beginning of man's development away from the animal with its blind instincts and dumb stirrings; it is in truth the primitive human life.

Man's first movements in pursuit of objects are not the result of his conscious

choice; in truth, they do not come from his will at all. These movements have their source in the mechanism of the human body. Man is born with certain paths of connection already established in his nervous system. These established nervous connections cause him to react with definite sequences of movement when his sense-organs are stimulated in certain ways. They are called *instincts*, and it is instinct which leads the human individual first to eat, to sleep, to play, to talk, to imitate, to resent. Instinct operates mechanically, as a bell rings when the button is pressed. Sometimes it is an article of food which, when visible, presses the button; the ringing which follows takes the form of movements to grasp, to bite, to swallow. Sometimes it is the sound of an approaching enemy which presses the button; then the ringing of the bell consists in the movements of limbs requisite to speedy flight. Or it may be that by the look or voice of another human being the button is pressed;

then the movements of play or of combat or of imitation constitute the response. But although instinctive movements have no conscious motives, they are accompanied by consciousness: the individual who reacts feels the exertion of moving to secure the object, and the pleasure of possessing it. Such experiences of movement and resulting pleasure associate themselves in memory with the sensations that originally came from the object and stimulated the movement. The result of the association is an idea of the object as an *end of action*, that is, a source of satisfaction. Thus in the early stage of his mental development man comes to have ideas of different classes of objects that appeal to his various instincts. The world into which human intelligence awakens contains, therefore, many kinds of objects that are interesting, that possess value because they promise enjoyment when attained. These attractive objects fall into two large groups. There are inan-

imate objects, such as food and drink and coverings, which appeal to the instincts of food and shelter and curiosity. Besides these are living beings which arouse such instincts as those of sex, of companionship, of play, and of combat.

Here, then, we find the true beginnings of the life of voluntary achievement. Upon these objects of natural instinct, become ends of conscious desire, the human will is directed: in pursuing and appropriating them volition achieves the first step in self-expansion.

Man's power of will is originally manifested, then, in seeking the object which he at the moment desires to obtain—the fruit on the neighboring tree, the companionship of a fellow, the refreshing coolness of a plunge in the stream, the smile or caress of a maiden, the view from the distant hilltop. Looked back upon from the vantage-point of later development, such indulgence of momentary desire seems simple and easy enough: the only effort which

civilized man exerts in connection with momentary desire is that required to resist its inherent impulsion and to restrain it in the interest of future well-being. From this superior standpoint it may seem absurd to regard the gratification of passing desire as an achievement of spirit, a triumph of personality. Why, it may be asked, is faith required to yield to the urgency of present impulse, where is the element of venture in seizing and enjoying what one happens at the time to want? But faith and venture are both of them present, nevertheless; desire is a genuine expression of will and these features are inevitable accompaniments of volition. Faith is present because the fulfilment of simple desire involves belief in the reality of the ideal. The object of desire does not exist except as an idea in the mind of the actor, yet his belief in the reality of his idea is strong enough to cause him to disregard all other things actually surrounding him and to expend

effort in seeking this ideal object. Faith is exercised even when the object desired is not merely imagined (as is frequently the case), but is actually present to the senses, tempting him with its alluring qualities; for it is never the object as present to the senses *merely*, which is desired and sought: it is such a sense-object *conceived as an end*, that is, thought of as affording specific satisfactions. Thus, when the savage desires the fruit he sees hanging from the tree, it is not simply the fruit which he perceives by sense of sight that he desires, but the fruit which he imagines as possessing certain pleasant qualities—that, for instance, it is sweet to the taste, cool and moistening to the throat, appeasing to hunger, etc. To seek an object of desire is also to venture. For the outcome of the simplest activity undertaken in response to desire is in some degree uncertain. The object may fail to possess the looked-for qualities, the agent may prove incapable of enjoying them even



if they are there, some unexpected event may frustrate his endeavor. In such case he will have expended effort in vain, he may have missed beneficial influences from the objects of his former environment, he may have incurred exhausting fatigue or met with injurious accident. Thus the savage who climbs the tree after the desired fruit may find it sour and unpalatable, or its expected sweetness may prove unpleasant and nauseating, or he may fail in his effort to climb the tree, perhaps falling and incurring injury. In such cases he certainly will have expended energy fruitlessly (no light matter with him, it may be), he may have missed the refreshing sleep which the quiet and the shade would have brought him had he remained lying in the grass beneath, and it is possible that he might be crippled by a fall.

Now it is just this faith, whether justified or not, which creates for man his first world. For in the operation of momentary desire a postulate is implied. This post-

ulate, when explicitly stated, is that *particular objects exist which, when attained, will exhibit certain characteristic qualities*. Such belief is not the result of logical reasoning (although accumulating experience may make it increasingly probable); it is an affirmation of will. But, although only a postulate, it transforms a succession of sensations into the consciousness of a world of objects. It is, in fact, man's will giving him a world. The contents of this world are many and varied; its objects vary with different races of men and according as the natural environment of these different groups varies. Yet there is a limit to this variation; for all men possess the same fundamental instincts and consequently come to value the same general sorts of objects. The objects in question are both animate and inanimate. In the latter class fall all the objects of the physical environment which have a bearing upon man's existence and comfort, such as fruits and minerals, wells and

streams, plains and mountains, sun, cloud, and rain. To the former belong both animals and men: the first thought of as supplying food and clothing, the second apprehended in the momentous social relationships of sex, parenthood, and clan-ship. The world which the human will creates in its first grapple with the conditions which confront it is thus a world of different things which possess characteristic qualities. These things are conceived as centres of activity, as substances, each displaying its own nature in distinctive attributes—and, in their aggregate, they constitute the primitive world.

Simple though the structure of this primitive world may be, it is the product of two different modes of thought: the object which first confronts the human will is really a combination of interpretations made from two different points of view. In the first place, the human individual who would act must apprehend objects in terms of the bodily movements

required to approach (or avoid) them. Thus objects are perceived to the right and left, as high or low, as near or far, as stationary or moving; they are *located* in space. Now the movements which must be made to obtain two different objects are never, at any one time, just the same; as we say, no two bodies can occupy the same position in space at the same time. Hence the perceived location of the single object in space belongs to it alone and is shared by no other. And since the movements which two or more different individuals must make to obtain the same objects are never just the same (two human bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time), the perception of objects as located in space is always, strictly speaking, an individual matter. Yet for small groups living in close proximity the location of different objects is practically the same. Their knowledge of the position of the things that concern them is in a large measure common knowledge:

for all of them the neighboring hilltop is high, the plain is wide, the ocean far toward the setting sun; for all the region of game is identical, the stream containing fish runs in the same direction. But, in the second place, the human being who chooses objects for pursuit must conceive them also in terms of the satisfactions they are able to afford him. Thus he is led roughly to classify objects according to their qualities—berries and flesh as good to eat, spring-water as clear and cool to drink, the skins of animals as warm to wear. Now, since the same satisfactions are furnished by many different objects (many kinds of food are edible, many kinds of skins are warm and dry) they do not as qualities belong, like location in space, to particular objects only, but are common to many. They are universals, are characteristics of classes of objects. Thus every object that is sought as an end by human volition unites both existence in particular time and place and value in

the possession of certain desirable qualities.

It follows that the action required to obtain the object of will in the first stage of its development is peculiar to the individual. To go to drink from the spring near by requires a different combination of bodily movements from every member of the clan. These movements cannot be described in general terms (not completely by our modern science and scarcely at all by primitive thought). They can, however, be imitated, and when to such imitation is added some elementary instruction through the medium of language, action begins to be generalized and standardized. Thus the clan learns to hunt together, to fight together, to build by common action some rude shelter. The ends of action, on the other hand, are in a measure common to different individuals from the start. For much the same satisfactions are sought by all men because their instinctive desires are identical and the quality of fur-

nishing such satisfaction belongs not to single objects but to classes of objects. Hence all the group may together seek and enjoy food, obtaining it in different ways from different sources. When in the development of language names are given to these universal qualities and they become the subject of discourse the foundation of intelligent social life is laid. Thus values are from the beginning social, and the social consciousness is originally a consciousness of value. This is a necessary result of the fact that, while the circumstances of human existence vary endlessly, and the modes of human action differ without limit, a unity of will underlies all human life in consequence of which men have common ends and desires.

The outcome of the activity which we have been considering, wherein the human individual seeks through his own bodily effort to secure the object which he at the moment desires, is a succession of enjoyments. This is the case, providing, of

course, he is able to obtain the objects which he seeks, that his actions are successful in yielding the satisfaction sought for. Now, it is not impossible that the succession of desires should, for a considerable time, gain fulfilment; for, as the child who is favorably situated may live a life of care-free delight or sunny enjoyment, now playing, now eating, now resting, as it pleases him, so Nature may prove an indulgent foster-parent, permitting her human children to enjoy an almost unbroken round of pleasure in the gratification of succeeding desires. Feeling may, therefore, be said to be the dominant factor in the natural life of man: the will which we have seen to be its source here strives to secure and prolong present pleasure and to escape the pain which momentarily threatens. The pleasures sought and enjoyed are not merely those which arise from organic well-being and betterment, however. These play an important part, to be sure, but to them is added the plea-



sure which comes from the successful attainment of an object with which the will of the individual has identified itself, from the unimpeded exercise of the will itself. Thus the savage, who obtains the game which he hunts, enjoys not merely the beneficial effects of the food which it provides but also his own success in the hunting. The satisfaction which he gains is not to be understood as simply a pleasant feeling which tones the consciousness of a living organism which has been affected beneficially; it is a composite, a concrete consciousness, a pleasure which results from the successful appropriation of an object which proves to have just those qualities for which it was chosen and sought. Indeed, it is possible for an action momentarily detrimental to man's physical well-being, to yield pleasure when attained, because his will has identified itself with just this object. Thus a savage might enjoy winning a race which he upon impulse had run with a fellow despite the

fact he was suffering great momentary pain in result of his unwonted exertions.

While it is possible that action from momentary desire should bring an unbroken succession of pleasures, it is exceedingly improbable. The conditions of man's existence on this earth are such as to make it practically impossible for him always to succeed in obtaining what he at the moment desires. Objects fail to yield the expected satisfactions: the well proves to be dry, the fruit to be bitter, the game to have migrated. Fellow humans fail to exhibit the looked-for traits: the trusted helper becomes the jealous rival, the admiring companion becomes the scornful critic, the friendly acquaintance becomes the vengeful foe. And when the objects sought after retain their pleasure-giving qualities the forces of nature are liable at any time unexpectedly to interfere and frustrate all man's efforts to attain them. In fact, the life absorbed in the pursuit of present pleasure exists, when it exists at

all, on sufferance of nature; the existence of those peoples who live entirely in the present and take little thought for the future is notoriously precarious. The sword hanging over their heads may have its slender thread cut instantly by any one of a score of perils, such as famine, pestilence, storm, wild beasts, or human foes, and the best that can be said for them is that their death when it comes may be mercifully swift, sudden, and unexpected.

Just here, in this thwarting of man's will in its efforts to secure the object which at the moment appeals to it, enters *evil*, the tragic feature in human life. Under the head of evil is included all the influences and tendencies arising out of the actual conditions of human life that hinder or frustrate man's will in its efforts at self-expansion. In the very first stage of human progress, when man's will expresses itself in effort to gratify present desire, evil is present unmistakably and ominously in its two characteristic forms.

It appears, first, as the failure of physical forces and objects to meet human expectations and to fulfil human needs. Secondly, it appears as the failure of other human beings to afford the satisfactions which the individual's social instincts cause him to expect from them, and this because they as individuals have desires of their own which they are seeking to gratify. The will of the human individual comes inevitably into conflict, first, with the forces of nature, second, with other human wills: in the first conflict consists natural or physical, in the second, moral or social evil.

It would appear, then, that man's world fails from the beginning to justify the faith he has put in it. Accepted modes of action do not result in the attainment of the desired object as was expected, and objects when attained do not manifest the qualities ascribed to them. How does the will react to this emergency? By surrendering its faith and sinking back into the quiescence of discouragement and de-

spair? Not at all! Volition's response is characteristic of its dauntless courage, its inexhaustible resource. To this crisis it responds with another belief more venturesome and far-reaching than the first. It assumes that the objects of desire are controlled by superhuman spirits who are susceptible to its influence, responsive to its appeal. The will of man proposes to insure itself of the satisfaction which it seeks by winning the favor and enlisting the strength of the spirits who control the objects of its desires. Thus the savage believes that the spring gone dry can be made to gush forth water if by prayer, adulation, or sacrifice he can gain the ear and secure the assistance of its presiding divinity. Hence he is led to take the measures which seem to be required in the way of religious rite and ceremony to insure himself of success in the hunt, victory in the fight, children in marriage.

At this juncture, then, we behold *religion* entering the world of human experi-

ence—religion, a factor of determining importance in man's life, an essential feature in his progress. In its earliest and simplest form religious faith consists in belief in the existence of agencies possessing more power than man possesses, because they are able to control actual objects and forces in a way that he cannot, and also having personality since they are capable of understanding man's petitions and sympathizing with his desires and acting to fulfil his needs. The gods are, therefore, from the beginning conceived as spirits. With the origin of man's belief in spirits, invisible personal agents, we are not here concerned. Probably a number of influences contributed to the formation of this belief. But these spirits become objects of religious faith only when they are controlling factors in conduct, when they are utilized as instrumentalities by volition in the achievement of its ends. Then the gods become man's helpers and protectors, co-operating with his will in its effort to en-

large the scope of his personality by giving him control over physical objects and forces, and over the psychical states of himself and his fellow men. The attribute of divinity most prominent in the infancy of religion is undoubtedly *power*. The gods are necessarily many, since the objects which affect, favorably or unfavorably, the fulfilment of man's desires are many and diverse. There are gods of the forest and the stream, of the mountain and the storm, of the fight and the hunt, of feasting and procreation. These divinities may be imagined in the forms of familiar animals but they always possess personal powers not attributed to any animal. Since, moreover, human desires have source in instincts common to all men, and the primitive group or clan seeks to gratify these desires in a common natural environment, the same divinities answer for the whole group. Religion is, therefore, a social institution from the start. As the gods possess the essential

attributes of personality the methods of persuading, beguiling, and (occasionally) threatening them are identical with those used in dealing with fellow men. Petitions are addressed to them, they are eulogized and cajoled, gifts are presented, bribes are offered, bargains are made. Since they are gods of the whole group, and the objects they control are desired by all and frequently sought by common effort, their worship tends to become a social ceremony and a symbol of group unity.

Even with the reinforcement of religious belief the effort of man's will to obtain satisfaction through the pursuit of the objects of momentary desire is doomed to failure. It may be difficult to understand how religion in this crude form could give any real assistance. How, may we ask, could man ever so deceive himself as to believe that his prayers and sacrifices would bring him success in the hunt or the fight? Surely his experience would soon teach him that the actual course of events



proceeded quite uninfluenced by his attempts to secure divine interposition in his favor. But we must not forget that it is precisely this actual course of events of which primitive man is most densely ignorant. As the game suddenly and mysteriously disappeared from its accustomed haunts, just so suddenly and mysteriously it might return. What more natural, then, than to ascribe its return to the interference of a friendly deity? The persistence and value of religion at this stage is not due, to be sure, to any intervention in the processes of nature made on man's behalf by his gods. Never, we know very well, was a single human desire fulfilled through a control of the natural conditions exercised by these imaginary beings. But faith in their existence and power enabled primitive man to keep faith in himself, in the power of his personal will, and in this lay the value of his religion. It gave him the strength and courage to keep on trying in the face of disappointment, failure, disas-

ter. Religion is here (as always) the will's affirmation of confidence *in itself*, in the power of personality and its ability ultimately to achieve that reality for which it yearns.

Despite the essentially unsatisfactory and ineffective character of the primitive life and the moral necessity for transcending it, this way of living is, nevertheless, the genuine starting-point of man's progress and, as such, is rooted permanently in our human nature. The more highly organized and comprehensive types of life which have replaced it are maintained only by continuous exertion of the will, and periodically we grow tired of exercising this power—of the strain of holding the attention fixed upon a remote and imaginary goal, of the effort of adjustment and contrivance required to fit the vivid, urgent present, with its demand for instant gratification, into the scheme or pattern prescribed by the visionary ideal. In such periods of moral fatigue we tend to relax

into the primitive mode of life, to abandon ourselves to the governance of passing impulse. Nay, more than this, the legitimate holidays that we all must take are necessarily of this character; for a time we allow ourselves to be absorbed in gratifying momentary desire, with the precaution that such pleasures as we may thus enjoy do not interfere seriously with the larger enterprises to which we have committed ourselves. Thus we relax in a holiday at the seashore (to choose a casual instance), losing ourselves in the sensations of the moment and heeding no influence but the call of passing desire, now walking on the sand, now taking a plunge in the surf, now resting on a hill in view of the sea, now sailing toward the distant island. On such days it is not difficult to relapse into the animism of our primitive ancestors: we seem to feel the spirit of the sea, now sunny and caressing, now brooding and sullen, now violent and implacable; we could worship the

sun in his serene and lofty course as the source of heat and light and growth; the voice of the wind becomes almost articulate with messages from far-away shores; the white sails of the distant ship seem animated even as the outstretched wings of the soaring gull.

## CHAPTER III

### THE NATURAL LIFE

IN the course of time man discovers another way of obtaining the object of his desire, more effective (if not easier) than invoking the power of its protecting divinity. This is to observe and to avail himself of the regular sequences of nature, thus utilizing natural processes and employing natural forces. From the beginning men seem to have had a vague notion of the existence of impersonal forces which controlled the objects of their world in a manner quite different from the personal influence exerted by divine spirits: the arts of magic believed in and practised by primitive people are proof of this. But such physical influence was so much less familiar than the control of nature by spirit which the earliest human experience appeared to illustrate, and promised assis-

tance so much less certain and immediate, that its possibilities were almost entirely overlooked in the hope of securing instant relief through divine interposition. But man could not remain for long blind to the regular succession of events in nature. He must soon notice that the green fruit preceded the ripe, and that both followed upon bud and blossom; he would observe that the growth and decay of vegetation followed the order of the seasons; he would also see that the same seasonal rhythm governed the movements of animals, their mating and reproduction, their migration and change of covering; nor could the effect of such physical influences as heat and cold upon the skins he wore, the food he ate, the water he drank entirely escape him.

To take practical advantage of these regular sequences of natural process seems to us a simple step; but to primitive man, groping his way in a strange world, the step was not easy nor to be taken quickly.

The hoarding instinct which man shares to some extent with the lower animals would encourage him to dry and store grains and herbs for the coming winter or to await the migratory movements of the animals in summer and autumn in order to secure meat sufficient for the months when they are absent, as the northern Indians hunt and kill the seal and caribou. Indeed, such provision for food and clothing and shelter during the cold and lean months of winter is the condition of human existence in the upper temperate and subarctic regions. It is still a long step, to be sure, from such enforced following upon the regular sequences of nature to the intelligent employment of natural processes to secure a purposed result, such as we find in systematic agriculture and animal husbandry. How this further step was taken need not concern us, although we may indulge our fancy by imagining how it may have been. A handful of grain scattered by accident

upon some soft and broken ground near the encampment in winter or spring would result in the growth of the familiar plant the succeeding summer; such growth with the ripening fruit would be connected in observant and retentive minds with the scattered seed; an enterprising individual would be prompted to experiment the next season by planting some grain he had carefully saved for the purpose. Or an animal, perhaps wounded, would be captured alive in the hunt; some whim of its captors or, maybe, real sympathy for its suffering and terror would lead them to relieve its pain, feed and fondle it; in the course of its gradual recovery it would be tamed and made submissive to the weight of man or child upon its back or to the tension and pull of the harness attaching it to cart or sledge. In some such way, we fancy, the first beginnings were made in tilling the soil and in the care and use of animals.

When man, in effort to provide for com-



ing needs, seeks ends which lie in the future and not in the present, he rises to a higher plane of achievement; he lays the foundation for a more comprehensive life. This larger life has also its source in volition. It is, in fact, just a further expression of will: the will to have a life not confined to the present moment but extending over and uniting a succession of moments, the will to have a world not of single objects merely but of regularly ordered events and uniformly acting forces. Arising as the creation of his own will as it encounters objective conditions, this new world costs man both effort and suffering; for future comfort is secured only by present toil, future suffering is prevented only by present privation, and thus to resist present desire and to forego the certain pleasure of its gratification requires an effort greater than any made hitherto. The larger life calls for a greater faith, the larger world involves more hazardous adventure. It is necessary to remind ourselves somewhat

forcibly of this fact, since through training and social experience, foresight and prudence have become so habitual with us that we are apt to forget that provision for the future springs originally from faith, not knowledge, that confidence in the uniform operation of natural forces is primarily an act of will rather than the counsel of reason. Faith must be exercised because that future welfare to which man must sacrifice the desire of the present exists, at the time when the sacrifice has to be made, only as an idea in his imagination. To this idea, to his ideal of a future life, man must attribute a reality superior to that possessed by the present in which he actually exists. Such reality he can give to his ideal future only through an act of will, and in such act of will, asserting the reality of the unperceived and unactual, consists faith. Of course, thought, interpreting past experience, may approve of such faith. Certainly faith, to be effective, must be based upon knowledge,

must go as far as possible under its guidance, and must never run counter to it. But knowledge can never justify such confidence in an imagined future, can never prove that this possesses a reality equal or superior to that possessed by the actual present. In the final reckoning, the future of any human individual must remain, as far as his knowledge is concerned, *uncertain*. Our knowledge enables us to forecast the future with remarkable accuracy, but does not guarantee it; all the science of civilized man does not enable him to predict with assurance what his future will be ten years ahead, one year ahead, one month, one week, one day ahead. The universe is so vast, its possibilities are so many and varied, that the element of contingency cannot be expelled from human life: always uncertainty will remain, always the unexpected will happen. Therefore, to sacrifice a present which, for all its limitations, actually exists—vividly, insistently, exists—and promises certain satis-

faction, for the sake of a future which the fullest knowledge must leave uncertain is in the fullest sense of the word, to venture; it calls for genuine courage. But, some one may interpose, even the animals, without the intelligence which enables man to foresee and plan, provide to some extent for their own future; they build shelters and store food for the coming winter. Surely such provision for future needs is not to be reckoned a great achievement on man's part! Yes, but the operation of instinct in the case of such animals converts provision for future need into a present impulse whose indulgence furnishes immediate pleasure. And man's intelligence, while it unrolls the curtain of the future a little way for him, also reveals to him what the animal never knows—the vicissitudes and uncertainties of earthly existence, the imminence of disaster and death, the transiency of mortal life. No, man's reason seems at times to justify him in snatching at the delights of the flying present, for-

getting if he can the perils of the future. Certainly intelligence does not give to man the fuller life to which he aspires, nature does not present him with the larger world for which he yearns. These must come through labor of spirit, through the "slow, dead heave of the will": man must walk by faith; he must have the courage to grapple with his own future.

The expansion of the boundaries of human personality to include the future along with the present and past, we thus see to be the work of volition. It rests upon a postulate of rational will, the second which is implied in man's personal development, the postulate that *events occur in fixed sequences which when followed out enable man to provide for his own future comfort and safety*. This is belief in the uniformity of natural processes as seen in their bearing upon human action. A recognition of the fixed order in which events actually occur makes it possible for the human individual to utilize objects

existing in the present as means which may be depended upon to produce purposed results in the future. Thus man is led to transfer the power to produce results which he feels in himself to these existing objects and they become for him *causes*. The postulate which we are considering is, of course, no other than the principle of causality. The uniformity of operation which this principle posits has a double application, to outer, or physical, and to inner, or psychical, events. Applied to the physical world, it means the discovery and acknowledgment of the more obvious and, in a sense, fundamental sequences of nature: those pertaining to the seasons and the weather, of the sun as causing light and warmth, of sultry heat as followed by cloud and thunder, of cloud as bringing rain; the sequences of plant and animal life, such as germination, growth, fruition, and decay; the action of the familiar materials, like wood, stone, skins, and finally metal, under diverse conditions,

such as heat and cold, pressure and strain. Uniformities are at the same time observed in the behavior of human beings. The sequences here perceived and utilized are really of psychical events, although, to be sure, psychical and physical processes have not as yet been clearly distinguished. Certain impulses are seen invariably to produce certain movements; the leading motives of human conduct are singled out and connected each with its characteristic expression. Anger is recognized as the cause of assault and blows, fear the cause of flight, lust as the cause of intrigue and abduction; love, moreover, is seen to result in loyalty and service, avarice in the accumulation of property and the hardening of the heart, indolence in poverty and dishonesty. Thus we find a nascent recognition of the two great types of causal relationship: the mechanical in the action of physical forces, and free agency in human behavior.

Upon these observed sequences in the

action of physical objects and of human beings is based a way of living which we may call the natural life—*natural*, because it is engaged in utilizing familiar forces of nature to preserve man's natural existence and secure his physical comfort. This has been the dominant mode of living among men since the dawn of human history; it is still the typical human life, lived by the great majority in Asia, by the peasantry of Europe, and the most of the rural population of America. In fact, until the modern industrial system took its rise, this mode of life was lived by all mankind except tribes of savages on the one hand and that comparatively small fraction on the other which, through favoring circumstances or superior intellectual endowment, had escaped its limitations and at the same time lost its substantial benefits. It is the life which follows the rhythm of the seasons, expanding into vigorous outdoor activity when the warm spring sun thaws the frost from the ground and dis-



solves with its genial rays the icy shackles which have bound brook and stream and contracting within doors to the sedentary occupations of the fireside when the frost returns in the late autumn and the wind blows bitter-cold over the snow-covered fields. It is the life which is rooted in the soil, the life of sowing and of reaping, of spring festival and of harvest home. Almost the whole of its sustenance is drawn from the soil which furnishes necessary food, and fuel for cooking and winter heat, and materials for building and tools. It is the life which depends upon the possession and employment of domestic animals: horses, cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry are systematically bred and cared for in order that they may serve purposes of transportation and draft, or may furnish food and clothing. The stable is an adjunct to the house, the poultry populate the dooryard; the offal from the stable feeds the land, the soil in its turn produces food for man and beast. The social life

which has this agricultural setting consists for the most part of the association of members of the family and the rural neighborhood in the common work of satisfying their fundamental physical needs. Co-operating in the toil of house or of field, participating in the hearty pleasures of the family meal, the mutual enjoyment of the warm hearth and comfortable bed, if to these common activities we add those which spring from the sexual and social instincts, such as courting and marrying, the begetting and rearing of children, with talking and jesting, the singing of songs and the playing of simple games, we have taken account of the main features of man's natural social life.

If we consider now the activities by which man seeks to attain future comfort and security, we find that they differ in important respects from those by which he seeks to gratify his present desire. In action from momentary desire which is the earliest and simplest expression of

will in man, the human individual endeavors through movements of his own body to gain possession of the desired object. Such movements are of necessity peculiar to the individual; they follow from his position relative to the object, from his own physique and skill; they cannot be generalized or reduced to rule. But the activities by which man endeavors to provide for his future welfare are based upon observed sequences of events. They can become matters of common knowledge; hence the activities based upon them can become the common practice of a people, or of mankind. The practice of agriculture which gives character to the type of human life we are discussing well illustrates this. Depending upon sequences of natural events carefully noted, the rotation of the seasons, the variation in the moisture of the soil, the stages in growth, and so on, the successive steps in this activity are identical from year to year, and the same with all individuals. The

practice of agriculture may thus be remembered and taught by one generation to the next; it becomes an art, and as such the possession of a tribe or people. Not being grounded in an experimental analysis of the actual conditions, such practices are not applicable by mankind universally; based rather upon empirical generalizations made in particular regions, methods of agriculture may be depended upon to produce the results aimed at only in regions where conditions of soil and climate are the same or very similar. But such activities, if they cannot be universalized, can at least be generalized, and therein lies their superiority to earlier activities which are individual accomplishments merely.

Faith in uniformities of natural events and of human behavior, a faith which repeated trial raises nearer and nearer to assurance, serves therefore as the foundation for the technic of industry and of government. In addition to agriculture

other arts are developed. The sequences occurring in the growth, nourishment, and reproduction of animals constitute, when perceived, the basis of the art of animal husbandry. The cooking of food, the dressing of skins, the making of weapons, the weaving of cloth, the building of houses become likewise arts, each with its established technic. Transportation with human or animal carriers and navigation of a crude kind are in their turn methodized. In the sphere of government and politics confidence in the uniform operation of certain leading motives among human beings makes possible an established procedure which is, of course, the essence of political organization. It is assumed that every man will, on the one hand, protect and cherish the members of his own immediate family, defend and seek to increase his own material possessions, augment if he can his influence and reputation among his fellows; while, on the other, he will, by every means in his power, attempt to

avoid suffering and death, the loss of property, social opprobrium, and disgrace. The strength of these motives serves to perpetuate and make effective the system of customs by which primitive society is organized; later they are relied upon to secure the enforcement of law. Here, also, experience converts faith into practical assurance, but there are sufficient exceptions to make the result uncertain enough when the attempt is made to control the behavior of the individual human being. Outside the authorized activities of government, in all the diverse associations of men in trade and industry, in the family circle, and in friendly companionship, this same faith is exercised, faith in the efficacy of specific motives, when once induced, to produce definite and predictable modes of behavior; it is the very cornerstone of intelligent social life. Yet how often does it fail! The son whom the father expected to arouse to instant and continued industry by an account of the

family need, or the description of a remarkable business opportunity, surprises his parent by showing no interest or energy whatsoever; he has his own purposes, unknown to every one, even his own family. In dealing with human beings who are free agents, action is doubly a venture.

When volition strives to extend its power over the future as well as the present, the *ends* which it seeks are, of course, more comprehensive. True, the quality which man believes the object of his momentary desire to possess and on account of which he seeks this object is, as we have seen, a universal: this same quality belongs to all members of a class of objects; it exists as a matter of common knowledge and, it may be, of common desire among different individuals. But when the purposes of the human will are enlarged to include the future, the ends aimed at are not simply universals, they are groups of universals, systems of qualities. Consider wealth, for example, when it is pursued as

a provision for future security and comfort. Its attainment means the possession of a multitude of objects, each of which has its characteristic attributes: abundant food, handsome clothing, ample holdings of land, horses and cattle, with many other incidental objects, each offering its distinctive satisfaction. The other "natural" goods of man, such as fame, health, and pleasure, are likewise systems of objects, each promising its distinctive satisfaction. These more inclusive ends which aim to cover and provide for the whole of man's natural existence are, in the second place, not merely common to different human individuals as are the qualities of single objects; they are, to be sure, thus common, but they are more than this. They are *communal*, that is, they provide for the satisfaction or well-being of more than one individual. The others whose well-being the individual seeks to secure along with his own are primarily those of his own family and immediate circle of friends;



yet in last analysis there is implied in the pursuit of these ends (often unknown to, and in spite of, the agent himself) a regard for the welfare of the community. They are, in fact, community ends. The man who seeks wealth almost never seeks it for himself alone; he wishes to support his family, to provide enjoyment for his friends. But suppose that he does seek it for his private pleasure merely, still its continued and peaceable possession by him would depend upon the maintenance of law and order in the community; hence his will to amass wealth for himself is also the will to support at least a rudimentary sort of order and justice among his fellows. The same is true of fame; if it is merely the craving for self-glory it must *will* some degree of discriminating intelligence and independent judgment to other men or else their praise and adulation would seem empty and worthless. Of course, it is possible to press this point too far. Wealth and fame and pleasure are not universal

ideals like truth and beauty, whose attainment by any individual confers a boon upon all humanity; their pursuit is often radically and ruthlessly selfish. The fact which deserves attention is simply this, that when man's purposes are enlarged to include the whole period of his natural existence, the identity of human interests is such that his ends become normally communal ends and that no such purpose is entirely without this reference to the welfare of the community in which he lives.

The natural life is pre-eminently a life of action. If feeling dominates primitive human life, it is action which gives character to the next stage in human development. Man endeavors to provide for his future well-being by unremitting industry in utilizing actually existent forces of nature as means, which will, he expects, through their uniform operation, produce this result. He toils in the field, in the house, in the workshop; he sows and he reaps, he

subjugates and employs animals, he journeys far for materials and builds himself houses, he dresses skins and weaves cloth, he constructs tools and weapons. His life is spent in a constant struggle to control the forces of nature; he must be vigilant as well as industrious, watchful and wary to seize every advantage and turn it to his own profit. This battle with, and conquest of, the forces of nature has left its indelible mark upon human character: the natural man is a man of action; he despises any other mode of life as trifling and unmanly. His view of the world alters to suit the change in his conduct: as his own activity gains in scope and efficacy, his world grows in continuity and coherence. Existing objects he no longer conceives in terms of the movements which he and his fellows must make to approach and avoid them, as a multitude of things located in space and thus externally related to one another. The actual world he rather conceives as the theatre where different forces

operate, forces which man may rely upon to produce certain results. Both physical objects and human beings are regarded as causal agencies whose behavior may be predicted and hence depended upon. Even in the sphere of values action is uppermost. Objects are sought for the sake of the actions which they make possible. Men seek to gain control of more land in order that they may raise more crops or pasture more cattle; they build houses in order to provide places suitable for cooking and eating, for the fashioning of clothes and the care of children, for friendly converse and merrymaking; they train horses in order that they may ride or may transport commodities. A very important difference exists, it is true, between that action which is sought as an end and that which is employed as a means. The action by which an object is sought is necessarily determined in course and character by the nature of that object or other related objects; it consists in the adjustment, the

adaptation, of actually existing forces and things to the attainment of the purposed end; it is essentially arduous and exacting—is *work*. Into the action which we seek as an end, on the contrary, the principle of freedom, the element of *play*, enters: we seek so to enlarge the field of possibilities as to be able to act thus (or otherwise) according to our choice. A man toils and saves to buy more land not in order that he shall be compelled to put it to a certain use, but in order that he may use it for agriculture or for grazing, for this crop or for that, as he pleases. Men work to build houses not solely for the sake of gaining a place where they may continue an arduous and compulsory routine, but, partly at least, in order to have a place so sheltered, so warm, so secure, that they may eat, sleep, be sociable, or carry on some other indoor occupation, as they see fit. The action which appeals to human beings as worth while for its own sake, and is therefore sought as an end, is *self-deter-*

mined, but this feature does not bulk very large in the natural life of man.

To overcome man's inability to secure the necessities of natural existence by means of a more extensive effort whose outcome is postponed to some future time but which sets going just those forces that, in the course of their regular operation, may be expected to supply the need of such future time—this is the attempt of human volition. By this effort man's outlook has been enlarged to envisage the future as well as the present; his life has been expanded to take in a system of interacting forces, a community of fellow-men behaving with characteristic freedom. Thus volition asserts its power over the whole of man's natural life; it strives to provide for his security and comfort during the whole period of his natural existence. To this end it finds several objects instrumental, and the attainment of these objects it takes for leading purposes. Such purposes are the accumulation of property,

the care and preservation of health, the formation of reliable social ties in family and community. To the realization of these purposes it proposes to make every act instrumental. Has the effort of man's will to insure him of a lifetime of secure and comfortable existence been successful? Has man's faith in the uniformity of natural processes, his confidence in the trustworthiness of human motives, been justified or not? How has his venture turned out? To these questions perhaps a sufficient answer is given by the fact that the leading world-religions, Christianity and Buddhism, numbering among their adherents more than half of mankind, assume as the axiomatic basis of their gospels that man's effort to gain for himself security and happiness in his earthly existence is a failure, that natural goods are not worth pursuing. Why? Because the forces of physical nature prove finally to be beyond man's control and the forces of human nature to be unaccountable and

treacherous. Nature flouts man's faith in her forces, his fellow-men betray the confidence he has placed in them. Always come disaster and disease, cruelty and neglect, old age and death. The worm lies at the core of all man's natural goods, the death's-head is present at every feast.

Again the spectre of evil appears and blocks the path of volition in its courageous advance to annex the unknown country of the future. To the efforts of man's will to organize his world, thus including everything that exists within the unity of his personal life, evil opposes itself as the fact of ineradicable maladjustment, of irreconcilable conflict. This stubborn opposition manifests itself in both natural and social spheres. The forces of nature prove to be—as far as man can observe and understand them—incalculable and uncertain; they refuse to be controlled, to be adjusted to the needs of human existence. To the faithfully cultivated



crops drouth comes, to the carefully tended herds pestilence; the result is famine and suffering. Houses and barns intelligently planned and laboriously constructed are demolished in a day by fire or flood. Whole regions, cleared and brought to a state of high fertility by the work of generations, with smiling fields, happy homes, and prosperous inhabitants, are destroyed by volcanic eruption, or laid waste by devastating storm. Disease strikes old and young, and its sudden attacks cannot be foreseen or effectually resisted. The man who, by industry and thrift, has accumulated sufficient property to insure himself of a comfortable livelihood and to provide for his growing children is himself prematurely stricken with the paralysis of old age, or left desolate by the sudden death of son or daughter.

In the social sphere, increased organization only brings into clearer relief the essential antagonism of men's natural interests. In order to provide for his own

future needs and insure his growing family of the means of subsistence and comfort, a man must concentrate his mind entirely upon his own affairs, devote himself unremittingly to his own task, and, in equal measure, neglect the concerns of his fellows. With the development of habits of industry and thrift comes inevitably some degree of insensibility to the needs and sufferings of others, of disregard for their welfare. The careless generosity of primitive life, the open-handed hospitality of the savage, gives place to the hard and close-fisted prudence of the industrious artisan or peasant. Thrift and prudence grow easily into avarice, and avarice makes men hard-hearted and cruel, willing to injure and oppress their fellows, even to enslave and torture them, if through their instrumentality the individual may increase his own fortunes. Then the possession and enjoyment of riches by the industrious, the able, the fortunate excite the envy and hatred of those who,

through indolence or misfortune, are suffering from lack of the necessities of life. These malcontents are incited thereby to deeds of violence against their more prosperous fellows—to robbery and arson and murder. Nor is it easy to see how these evil results which attend upon social evolution could be prevented; for the material goods which the world supplies are limited in amount, and their accumulation to any marked degree in the hands of the few means that the many must go without.

Social organization not merely brings to light latent antagonisms between individuals within the group; it also appears to encourage rivalry and even enmity between groups. As the result of systematized communal industry, orderly social life, and stable government, there is developed in the minds of the individuals thus associated a consciousness of tribal or national unity. They come to take pride in the power and possessions of their tribe or nation; they become jealous of its

prestige and ready to resent any real or fancied transgression of its rights by other peoples. Social organization makes possible also concerted action in defense of group interest. A little experience in fighting is sufficient to show the advantages of capable leadership and strict discipline in warfare. Hence the art of war is also systematized: leaders are chosen and obeyed, armies are drilled and equipped. When, in addition to glorying in the military exploits of its armies, a people is attracted by the idea of adding to its own possessions through the easy method of plundering those of neighboring peoples, it is well on the way to a career of military conquest. Then follow all the horrors of war that we know only too well, ills wreaked by men upon their brother men: bloody wounds and death agony, brutal lust and savage cruelty, helpless misery and smoking ruins. Following the train of continued warfare come other social ills, less acute but more lasting, such as captive

slavery, the abduction and subjection of women, and military despotism.

In this emergency, also, it is religious faith which gives man the courage to continue, the hardihood to endure. His primitive religion develops to meet the needs of his enlarged life. His gods are no longer nature spirits, able, when he invokes their power, so to control the object or process over which they preside as to furnish him with the satisfaction which he desires. They have acquired permanent character, distinct individuality, because to them are attributed characteristic purposes, individual aims, which they strive continuously to realize. From this continuity of divine purpose comes a uniformity of divine action, which may be depended upon in the future as well as remembered of the past. As the result of assigning permanence of purpose to the gods and thus imparting more definiteness and power to their personality, they are gradually loosed from their close connection with particular

objects and processes in nature. In consequence of this separation they grow fewer in number and continue to preside only over the different departments of nature, such as the sea or the earth or the heavens, and the major activities of human life, such as love or learning or warfare. The important thing to notice just at this point is that the gods are believed to have abiding interests of their own and to be constant in their devotion to these interests. What these divine purposes are conceived to be may and does vary greatly: in some mythologies they are represented as self-aggrandizing ambitions or corrupt intrigues, in others they are in a certain sense benevolent, as when the tribal or national deity is supposed to glory in the military conquests of his people. But at any rate the gods have established purposes: in these purposes they are permanently interested, of them they are exceedingly jealous. And just as two men having two very definite and very different ambitions may see the

advantage of co-operation, and may make a compact whereby each serves the interest of the other, so man and God may covenant with one another, each agreeing in a specified way to serve the other's interests. Thus if man will but keep the law of God handed down in the sacred writing, or constantly follow the prescribed ritual of worship once divinely revealed and miraculously preserved through the ages, God will shield him from calamity, protect him from disease, insure the safety of his possessions, preserve the life of his children. And the gods will keep their promises. No matter how unsatisfactory or even discreditable from an ethical standpoint the special ambitions of individual deities in this type of religious faith may be, the gods have at least this virtue which lies at the foundation of all intelligently organized society—they will be true to a compact, they are bound by an agreement. To power is therefore added *justice*—justice in the sense of giving what is due, paying

what is owed—which becomes the leading attribute of deity in this second stage of human progress.

Religion thus plays a necessary and important part in the natural life of man. Shrines mark the turnings of the road, temples crown the hilltops, churches dot the countryside. In his religion man here but reaffirms his belief that there is an intelligible uniformity in the operation of natural forces, reaffirms it in the face of hazardous uncertainties, unexpected exceptions, calamitous interruptions. Only, the uniform action of natural agencies he now refers back to the continuity of divine purpose operative in the world. Sometimes the purposes of the gods are conceived as identical with the leading human purposes, as when we have gods of war, and of wisdom, and of agriculture; then a human individual may honor a deity when he pursues his own legitimate life aims, and has a right to expect divine protection in the prosecution of his enterprises. But usu-



ally the gods are supposed to be interested chiefly in their own glory; then it is a fair exchange of services between God and man: man by prayer and sacrifice glorifies God and God so controls the forces of nature as to avert calamity from him and insure the fulfilment of his ambition. Religion thus expresses man's faith in the power of purpose to control the actual course of events—the power of purpose which he is conscious of having himself exerted, but being in his case challenged by an intractable and incalculable world. The moral value of such faith is easy to appreciate. It gives man courage to undertake the pursuit of aims whose fulfilment can come only after years of toil and waiting, in the far future, near the end of life, perhaps; for his purpose, which seems puny and insignificant when pitted against the resistless onrush of physical events, is strengthened and reinforced through its alliance with a more powerful purpose able to control even the mighty forces of

nature. It gives him also courage to endure setback and failure, even to rise undaunted after overwhelming calamity, because he believes God is on his side and will see him successfully through at last. Nor is it difficult to see how such faith in the controlling influence of divine purpose over nature could persist—at least for some time. For the very courage to endure with unshaken resolution calamity and failure, and the initiative to begin afresh with undiminished vigor and undimmed hope are themselves most effective influences in bringing ultimate success. And when the purposes of the pious man are completely and finally set at naught by unfavorable circumstances it is always possible to suppose that his piety was really spurious and that the disastrous outcome of his life but exposed his previous hypocrisy.

After a time it becomes impossible longer to believe that piety, when added to foresight and industry, will certainly bring prosperity and avert accident in the nat-

ural life of man; it is seen that the rain from heaven falls alike on the just and the unjust. The reward of the man who has labored faithfully in the fear of God is then believed to be postponed to the after-life; the fulfilment of his purposes are supposed to occur in another world. In this after-life the individuals who have been idle and malicious, false to their vows, and neglectful of divine worship, receive also their just recompense of frustration, failure, and suffering. Thus in the world-to-come a final adjudication of human affairs is made and all earthly debts are paid; for God is not merely Lawgiver, he is Judge of all the world. Thus to resort to belief in another world distinct from the natural and to rely upon this world for the fulfilment of purposes undertaken here, for the final rewards of the earthly existence, may seem to be a confession of failure and bankruptcy on the part of the natural life of man. So in a sense it is; yet the after-world as a place

of final rewards and punishments acquires no reality distinct from, and independent of, the natural world. It is rather a shadowy counterpart of the natural world with some shifting of scene and changing of character, and it exists as a kind of postscript or appendage to it. Belief in the value of natural goods is not abandoned, nor is faith in the natural methods of obtaining them destroyed; only the powers of imagination are enlisted to provide a longer time for the working of the methods and the enjoyment of the results. Thus a sort of compromise is struck: when the diligent, god-fearing man succeeds in amassing riches and enjoying their possession his success is attributed to his own efforts and the divine favor; but when the endeavors of such a man are unsuccessful and he suffers from his failure, his pain and disappointment are looked upon as temporary trials for which he will be more than recompensed by an added amount of happiness in the world to come. While the introduction

of the after-world with its rewards and penalties, as a factor which must be reckoned with by the individual who plans and works to insure his future existence and well-being, does not mean the elevation of man to a different and higher plane of living, still it does foreshadow the final breaking-up and abandonment of the ideals and practices of the natural life, since it indicates a growing dissatisfaction on the part of man with the limited outlook which the course of natural existence offers to his will, an increasing impatience with the uncertainties of its prospects, the transiency of its joys.

Notwithstanding its limitations, the natural life is a necessary stage in human progress, and hence its aims and activities retain an important place in human life. Man must establish himself as a natural being in the natural world before he can project the loftier ideals of a universal spiritual life; nay, he must, as we shall see, return to nature for a closer grapple

and more thorough conquest of its forces before he actually realizes these universal spiritual ideals. The natural life makes therefore a permanent appeal to the normal human being. It has about it a peculiar substantiality which causes men to look back upon it with longing, to return to it with relief, after protracted and soul-taxing effort spent in the pursuit of spiritual ideals, which by contrast, seem often to be insubstantial, elusive, unreal. It is the life rooted in the soil, and from the soil it draws vigor and hardihood. It follows the rotation of the seasons and participates in the periodic revival, growth, and fruition, which accompany seasonal change. It battles often victoriously with the crude elemental forces of nature and acquires therefrom masterfulness and virility. We are none of us insensible to the appeal of the natural life with its call to hard labor and its promise of solid enjoyments; back to the soil men must at intervals go, it would seem, for renewing of

strength and steadying of nerve. If the spring-morn or the summer-day awakens the *wanderlust* within us, tempting us to fare forth into woods and field, following momentary impulse and doing what for the present pleases us, a mellow October day with its message of rich fruition brings home to us the tangible rewards of the natural life: we would have a share in the farmer's work and the farmer's pleasures, participating in the vigorous, hopeful, preparations of the spring, in the hard but effective toil of the summer, in the joyful activities of harvest and harvest home, in the satisfaction of facing the coming winter with well-filled barns, abundant fuel, and comfortably furnished house.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SUPERNATURAL LIFE

As his pursuit of present pleasure brings man disappointment and disaster, so his endeavor to insure himself of comfort and well-being during the course of his natural lifetime turns out to be a failure. A conviction of the essential uncertainty of the natural life and the consequent transiency of its joys is either produced in him slowly as the outcome of observation and experience of the vicissitudes of fortune in his own case and that of others, or else bursts upon him with overwhelming force as the result of some devastating personal calamity. But the breakdown of the ideals and practices of the natural life does not leave human volition crushed by defeat or prostrate through failure: it responds to the emergency with characteristic faith and vigor by projecting the plan of a larger



and more permanent life. On the ashes of its burnt-out hopes of natural security and satisfaction it raises the ideal of a life which shall be beyond the reach of misfortune and decay, a life of eternal and abiding reality. For, incidental to his pursuit of natural goods, man had learned of the existence of ends whose attainment depended upon the favor of no external agency whatsoever, but exclusively upon the activity of his own will. His capacity for thought was his own, he could exercise it in acquiring knowledge in bad fortune as well as good: his power of choice remained with him while he had life and sanity; his emotions could be trained to find pleasure not in pursuing or appropriating material objects but in contemplating the beautiful and harmonious in nature and in man. Devotion to such spiritual ends now promised to give widest scope to human personality, greatest substantiality to human life. In order that it might give itself unreservedly to their

pursuit volition attempted to shake itself free from all entanglements of body, all limitations of natural existence; it proposed to rise to a supernatural life.

The supernatural life is therefore characterized primarily by its devotion to "spiritual" ends. But the term "spiritual," when thus used, stands in pressing need of definition and explanation. For no word in common speech is more vague and indefinite than this. Standing in the thought of most persons for something that is misty and elusive, its significance has been cloudy and confused. "Spiritual," as ordinarily used, suggests the invisible and intangible, the morally elevated and edifying, the divine and ecclesiastical—a mixture of ingredients, with a mystic flavor. Now this vagueness and incoherence spring from the fact that the meaning given to the word is principally negative: the spiritual is understood as that which is different from, and opposed to, the natural or material. Hence it remains as essentially

the imperceptible and non-sensuous, the invisible and intangible. Given no positive qualities of its own, our thought tends almost inevitably to conceive it as the shadowy counterpart of the material, less definite in outline, less substantial in structure. The spiritual world is thus imagined as the abode of insubstantial apparitions; the spiritual life becomes the pursuit of sublime but ghostly abstractions. Moreover, anthropologists have found in primitive human thought the belief in such a shadowy duplicate of the material world, peopled by ghostly doubles of actual human beings, and this belief they suppose to have originated in the attempt of primitive man to explain the episodes and personages of his dreams. Thus the idea of a spiritual realm seems to many to be discredited as a relic of savage superstition. The conception of a spiritual life and a spiritual world lose their last touch of reality; they dissolve away completely into a cloud of myth and fancy.

The truth is that the spiritual world possesses as much positive reality as the material. The idea that it is a dream world, an imaginary realm, is false and preposterous. The fact that spiritual goods become constant and enduring objects of pursuit by the human will may seem sufficient proof of the reality of the spiritual—and so, indeed, it is. But in order that the real nature of the spiritual world shall be understood, its positive qualities must be discovered and its relation to the material world clearly perceived. Now we have already noted the need from the standpoint of voluntary action, of representing objects in terms of the bodily movements required to attain them. This need our intelligence meets by constructing the world of matter and of motion. As a further development of this same point of view, we have found it advantageous to think of objects in terms of the movements of other objects supposed to produce them, and in result the world is conceived as a

complex of interacting forces. The neighboring spring I thus represent as in a fixed location—at the foot of yonder hill—and conceive it as the result of the down-rush of subterranean water. But it is equally necessary if our wills are to find expression, to conceive of objects in another way, and that is in terms of the satisfactions they promise and the further ends to which they lead. In consequence of this primary personal necessity the spiritual world arises, and it is equally original, equally authoritative with the material. The spring which from the material standpoint is situated in a definite place and is the effect of certain causes is, from the spiritual standpoint, the means of slaking human thirst, of restoring man's strength and renewing his vigor for further activities. Who can deny that the thirst-quenching quality is an objective fact, just as real as any object of the material world? The relation of the objects constituting the two worlds is altogether dif-

ferent. In the material world objects are related to men's physical organisms, which are diverse and exclusive, hence their relation is external and mechanical. In the spiritual world they are related to the rational will, which is one in all human beings; hence their relation is essential and organic. Since many different material objects may possess the same quality of satisfying the human will, such a quality is recognized as a universal and, as such, is part of the spiritual world. Many different springs and wells have the quality of slaking human thirst: this quality is therefore a universal; it has no place in the physical world but belongs to the spiritual realm. But while a multitude of physical objects have the one same valuable quality, it is also true that a single physical object may possess many valuable qualities—its meaning may include many universals. Thus the single deer-skin may serve as clothing, as a tent-covering, or as a case for tools and weapons. The con-

trast between the two worlds, that of matter and of spirit, comes home to us with full force when we consider that an object which, from the standpoint of the material world, is one of the most insignificant, feeble, and temporary features in the landscape, like a shepherd's cot on the mountainside, may easily be the most real and significant object there from the spiritual point of view, because it has the most comprehensive purpose and makes possible the widest range of intelligent activity.

The modern city may serve as an illustration of the difference between the two worlds, for it can be understood from the standpoint of matter or of spirit. Viewed physically, it is an aggregate of buildings and of living individuals, the buildings of wood and stone and steel, spread over a vast expanse, massed together and pressed upward toward the centre, and the living individuals hurrying to and fro, out and in, among them; it has a river flowing

through it and lines of railway converging upon it; in the more congested centres are stores and banks and offices, farther out are dwelling-houses, churches, and schools, still farther, perhaps, are factories and parks and cemeteries. Spiritually, the city is a "kingdom of ends": first, although lowest in the scale of spiritual reality, are the industrial and economic purposes which it subserves, the food and clothing and shelter which its activities of production and distribution provide for its inhabitants; these are but means to the more inclusive ends of the family life, of education, of political organization; this second class of objects is in its turn instrumental to the still fuller personal life which libraries and churches, museums and universities make possible. The same city, but how differently are its constituent factors related in the two worlds! In the one, a museum and a business house may crowd one another in the same block, a factory may stand beside a park, but in the other the museum



and store, park and factory, belong to different grades of reality.'

The existence of the spiritual world is, to be sure, not a late discovery of human intelligence, but its explicit recognition and continued study had to wait for the time when man should turn away in disappointment from the pursuit of natural goods. In giving names to the common qualities which he found numbers of physical objects possessing, primitive man acknowledged the existence of another order than the physical. For these names stood for permanent satisfactions which classes of objects could be expected to furnish the human will. These universals determine conduct; they become ends of action with the individual, and he seeks by talking of them and their attractive features to influence the action of others. The generalized purposes which are pursued in the succeeding stage of human development are not merely satisfactory qualities, they are groups or systems of satisfactions. Wealth is sought

because it opens the way to many further activities at the choice of the agent (only, as we have seen, these activities are usually of a physical character). Here, again, the communication of general purposes makes possible mutual influence and co-operation among men. But these purposes, involving series of activities, systems of objects, have to be discussed and explained if they are to be understood by all members of the community. It is as the outcome of such discussion and explanation that the conception of a spiritual world takes its rise. The idea then dawns that men may by thought and discussion classify objects in terms of the satisfactions which they themselves afford and the further ends to which they lead. The discovery is made of another world than the natural, an ideal or spiritual realm, a world of values, dependent for existence not upon physical force but on rational reflection and appreciation. This world is justly deemed a spiritual world, because, as has been said, its interrelations

and unity flow directly from the one rational will which actuates all men. Its determining principle is not mechanical necessity but spiritual freedom. Its compelling attraction, moreover, its power to arouse enthusiasm and awaken aspiration, testifies directly to the demand of the one will surging through us all, a demand for a larger and fuller life.

Because of the importance of the spiritual principle to human progress, further consideration must be given to the constitution of the spiritual world and the development of the ideal of the spiritual life.

Beginning the discussion afresh, therefore, let us first note that the object which we locate as a particular thing in the physical world becomes, when we consider it from the standpoint of the purpose it subserves, a *universal*. As a universal, it is identical with no particular thing existing in a definite time and place; it is identical with the quality or character common to a number of particulars and uniting them

into a class. Thus, *house*, from the physical standpoint, is a particular thing; each house has its special time and place of existence. The house I live in has its particular situation: I must walk in a certain direction if I would approach it, mount several steps and turn a knob if I would enter. But *house*, in the light of the purpose which gives it its meaning, that of affording shelter to human individuals and families, is a universal, because this quality of furnishing shelter belongs equally to all the habitations of men. From the spiritual standpoint, then, the real object turns out to be not the particular member of a class but the essential character which all members of the class possess in view of the purpose they all subserve. Indeed, from this point of view, these universal meanings are the primary realities; a particular thing derives what reality it possesses from participating in the essential quality characteristic of its kind or class. My house is a reality, not on account of the accidents of

its size, location, and material, primarily, but rather because of its essential meaning, a meaning which belongs to all houses because they realize the same end of providing shelter. It was Plato who first saw with clearness the reality of these universal characters, founded upon the common purposes which things subserve; he asserted that such ideal entities were the only things truly real; he called them *ideas*, and since his time they have been known as Platonic ideas.

Now, the distinguishing mark of these ideal essences or characteristics is their universality, and their universality at first appears in the fact that they are *general* and not *particular*. The degree of their universality will consequently be seen to depend upon how general they are, how many objects they are common to. It is obvious, moreover, that characters differ widely in generality and hence in the universality which depends upon it. More general than house in meaning is human

production, for it includes tools and weapons and clothing as well as shelters—everything in fact that man can make and fashion. As essential characters differ in degree of generality they may be arranged in a series leading from the least to the most general, as, for example, Socrates, Athenian, Greek, Aryan, Man, Living Being, Being. Since these universal qualities represent purposes which groups of objects fulfil for the one rational will which acts in all men, they are not by nature independent of one another nor separate in their fields of existence. Differing themselves in degree of generality, these characters are subsumed, the one under the other, as the less under the more general, as species under genus. Thus, “house” in meaning falls within “building,” which includes also barns, workshops, etc.; “building” falls under the head of “human productions,” which embrace, in addition, tools, clothing, and the like. Proceeding with such classification, all qualities or

characteristics may be subsumed under the one least definite and most common, as the *summum genus*, and thus united in one system. Thus plants, animals, and men fall under the concept of living being, and this, along with that of inanimate or non-living being, under the concept of being. *Being*, the most general of characteristics, signifies that quality which an object must have to become an end of volition at all—the power of reacting to the human will, and hence conditioning its expression. Thus our thought, exploring the meaning of things, discovers a system of characters, all universal and all purposive; this system is of course none other than the Platonic hierarchy of Ideas.

Let us, then, acknowledge this truth: these ideal characters are fully as much facts as are the objects or events of the physical world; their relations are every whit as essential and binding as the sequences of physical events; together they constitute a system just as real as the inter-

acting forces of the material world. The reality of this ideal or spiritual system is implicitly acknowledged in every act of volition. But its conscious recognition adds much to the scope and significance of human life, besides reminding man of the dignity of his own freedom. For man to understand that the object which he realizes is in its essential character universal enlarges his conscious horizons; he recognizes that his experience is not private, particular, exclusive; he sees instead that in attaining his own end he is participating in universal human achievement. Understanding further that the end which he seeks has a permanent place in an abiding system of meanings, he is able in its attainment to rise free from the changing flux of physical events and identify himself with universal and eternal reality. Reflection brings home to him the universality of all human intelligence, the fundamental unity of all human volition, and on this foundation he may build his own personal character



undisturbed by the change and decay of the physical world. Moreover, this first insight into the structure of the spiritual world increases man's knowledge of the possibilities of attainment which exist for his will. The system of meanings just described is in truth a world of freedom, for its constituent factors have their character and position determined not by any external agency but by their relation to the human will itself. As first formulated by Plato the hierarchy of ideas was retrospective rather than prospective in its reference, it is true—conceiving of objects not so much in terms of the further purposes which they might subserve as in terms of the qualities which they, at least by implication, already possessed and were able to offer. Thus my house is not conceived in terms of the many further purposes which it may fulfil but in accordance with the qualities already inherent in its essential character as a house—that it is a building, a physical object, etc. But if,

understanding this, we appreciate all that is implied in the meaning of things, we shall enormously enlarge our possibilities of satisfaction, shall greatly enrich the resources of our world.

We acknowledge the existence of universal characters, due to the fact that the groups or classes of objects furnish to the will the same satisfaction. House is such a general character, since the purpose of giving shelter is common to all houses. But in addition to the features that are common to all cases, these general characters have a further meaning which differs in different instances of their appearance. This is due to the fact that the further ends or activities to which these ideal characters lead are different in different cases. *All* houses share in the common purpose of furnishing shelter, but *some* are means to many further ends; all furnish the one fundamental satisfaction, but some make possible many more extended activities: all houses give shelter;

some are, in addition, centres of family life and domestic devotion; a few of these latter are also sources of far-reaching social benefit. Now, the point to be noticed just here is that the meaning of the ideal characters we are discussing includes, in the case of each one, all the further ends to which it may lead. Hence its universality consists not merely in its generality, in the *number* of instances of its *same* identical quality which it sums up, but also in the variety of *different* features which it includes. Its full meaning, its total character is therefore seldom, if ever, exemplified by every one of its instances; indeed, it would seem that the more fully the meaning of a character is developed, the fewer are the instances of it which we should likely find. Searching, therefore, for the true meaning of universal spiritual objects, we are forced to choose between instances, seeking for those in which the possibilities of the character in question have been most fully explored. We should

not expect to find the full meaning of house in the qualities common to all houses from the Indian wigwam to the royal palace; we should seek for it in those cases where houses were made to furnish the greatest variety of human satisfactions.

To recognize that objects whose general character is well known are capable of yielding different degrees of satisfaction, according as one has the intelligence to grasp their possibilities and the enterprise to follow them up, is still further to enlarge the opportunities for voluntary achievement. The scope of activity which the real world permits to human volition is seen to depend not entirely upon the number of objects it attains—this, as we have seen, is determined largely by fortune and circumstance—but partly, at least, upon the use which it is able to make of the objects it does possess. A man with the wit to understand the uses to which a house may be put, and the ability to avail himself of the

means which it places at his disposal, may obtain a more extensive satisfaction from a cottage than many another does from a mansion. This fact was relied upon by the Cynics and Stoics, ethical schools of antiquity, to support their cardinal doctrine that man finds happiness and spiritual freedom only when he ceases to depend upon material possessions and seeks those spiritual ends whose attainment depends only upon his own reason and will. The wise man, they held, can turn any event or circumstance into a means of personal development by understanding its universal character and availing himself of its possibilities for spiritual expansion. Even the direst calamity, his reason will show him to be the necessary outcome of universal law, and capable when properly met of strengthening his courage and increasing his power of endurance. If a storm lay waste his fields and destroy his crops, his reason will understand it as a result of those regular processes of atmospheric change which are

responsible for the invigorating breeze and beneficent rain; thus he may accept the event calmly, even gratefully, regarding the necessity for repair and rehabilitation which it creates as an opportunity for the exercise of his courage and enterprise. Reason not merely discovers the permanent possibilities of satisfaction already existing in the world, it also reveals the opportunities for further achievement offered by every event that occurs.

We have not exhausted the meaning of the spiritual world, however, when we see that its ideal constituents, besides being repeated in many different instances, may themselves be means to many different ends. In this way we do enlarge our conception of their universality, understanding it not merely as generality but as comprehensiveness. But this new insight has important consequences which, when made clear, will bring us in sight of our goal—and show us the spiritual world as a growing reality. These ideal objects differ in

the degree of their comprehensiveness, in the range of further activities to which they are instrumental. Varying as they do, certain ones which are less comprehensive are included within the meaning of others which are more so, not generically, as the particular falls within the more general, but organically, as the part is included within the whole of which it is a member, and to whose existence it is instrumental. Thus gymnasium, in its ideal character or meaning, not merely falls as a particular under the more general concept of building, it is also included as a factor in the more comprehensive character or significance of college or university to whose life it is instrumental. Relating these spiritual objects in the order of their comprehensiveness, we shall see them in the fulness of their reality as an *expanding system*. Thus individual security, family life, the possession of property, the establishment of reputation, are all of them involved in tribal or community well-being; the well-being of the

community thus maintained, of many communities, in fact, is included within the more comprehensive meaning of national welfare, realized through care for public health and education, the administration of just and effective government, convenient facilities for communication and transportation, efficient methods of producing wealth and fair methods of distributing it; national welfare, and international as well, are themselves included within the still more comprehensive end of universal human well-being depending upon mutual understanding, mutual co-operation, and mutual sympathy among *all* men, ends which are just beginning to be realized, and thus converted into spiritual realities. This spiritual system represents the progressive expansion of the sphere of free human activity, hence the progressive realization of the human will; it is a system whose character and constitution are determined by no other agency than rational volition itself.

Appreciating how the objects of the spir-



itual world are related in an order of increasing comprehensiveness, we are led inevitably to the thought of an *all-comprehensive object*, an object which includes in its meaning all possible qualities, an object which, in its attainment, subserves every purpose and realizes every end. Now this conception, while it is merely an ideal and does not really constitute the spiritual world a completed whole, has nevertheless an important regulative office in pointing out the direction of its development and indicating the goal of its progress. The conception of an object so comprehensive as to include in its meaning all possible satisfactions is simply an expression of the demand of volition itself for an all-comprehensive life; it is this demand projected in the form of an ideal, an end to be realized; once attained, it would insure to the will a life of uninterrupted activity, of perfect satisfaction. The life promised through the realization of the Absolute Ideal presents itself in different forms: as thought, which

through the classification and correlation of all ideas, attains Truth; as feeling, which through an appreciation of the harmonies among perceived objects, attains Beauty; as conduct, which through a proportionate realization of all human capacities, attains Goodness. Since, further, the Absolute Ideal is conceived as furnishing complete satisfaction to rational volition as such, it must provide through its activities for the satisfaction of volition in all its individual embodiments. This means that it must provide for the satisfaction of all human individuals in so far as the power of rational volition has gained expression through them. Hence the Absolute Ideal may be conceived as a perfected society of free persons, an intelligent community united in complete mutual understanding, co-operation, and sympathy. Such a life, indeed, does volition aspire to; it stands, therefore, as the supreme ideal of human conduct.

While the conception of an all-comprehensive object has an important bear-

ing upon the structure of the spiritual world, we must not forget that it is, nevertheless, an idea and not a reality. For there is a distinction between a spiritual ideal and spiritual reality. This distinction is one easy to overlook because spiritual objects are all of them ideal in the sense that they are universal and are related not mechanically but teleologically. Impressed with what we may thus consider to be the ideality of the spiritual world as a whole, we are naturally inclined to slur over any distinction between idea and fact within its boundaries. Yet this distinction holds, and cuts very deep. *Real* spiritual objects are objects which have been *realized* through voluntary action, whose possibilities of satisfaction have been proved through the experience of actual attainment. Of this character are many established social goods, such as family life, popular education, democratic government, etc. These ends have been in large part realized and their meaning

for volition actually verified; one may seek them with reasonable certainty of obtaining their promised satisfaction. Even the more comprehensive ends of truth and beauty have been so far attained as to make their value a fact for human intelligence: science and art each opens the way to a wide range of free activities. But the ideal of a perfected society of free beings, of the completed development of human personality, of universal human brotherhood, has not thus been realized—at least not sufficiently to warrant us in considering it a reality. It is an ideal, the supreme, the governing, ideal of human conduct, but as yet *idea* and not reality.

A serious error it is, therefore, to regard the Absolute Good as a real object in the spiritual world. Yet just this error was committed by those wise and earnest souls of antiquity who first clearly recognized the existence and structure of the spiritual world and sought to identify themselves

with its reality. The idea of an object comprehensive enough to satisfy every intelligent purpose they took to be the ultimate reality. Or, otherwise expressed, reality they believed to be a teleological system, every part of which was the expression and fulfilment of intelligent will. So thought the Stoics who, of all the ancient schools of moral philosophy, attained to the clearest and most adequate conception of the spiritual world and the spiritual life. They believed that the existing universe or "nature" was really a perfect spiritual system, every part of which was determined by rational purpose. For man himself to realize the universal spiritual ideal no effort on his part was required to *transform* the actual conditions of his life—every event that actually occurred in the world was already a necessary means to the fulfilment of the Universal Purpose. He had only to understand the circumstances of his own life, whatever they might be, in their true reality and he would find

them to be expressions of the One Rational Will pervading the universe and manifested in his own personality, would see them, in fact, as the realization of his own freedom. In the sphere of action, consequently, the Stoic doctrine required of the human individual not effort but acquiescence. This meant, however, that the whole burden of moral attainment was thrown upon human thought: it was man's reason which was relied upon to raise him to eternal spiritual reality. And it was no light task which was thus assigned to human intellect—to understand how every object that existed, every event that occurred, no matter to what extent it frustrated man's plans and thwarted his purposes, no matter how much suffering it caused him, was, nevertheless, a means to the fulfilment of the Universal Purpose which was his purpose. Of course, it is impossible thus to conceive of all human experiences if we take them at their face value, as they actually present themselves.

Hence the logic of their position compels those who, like the Stoics, believe that all reality is comprehended within one spiritual system to regard much of what occurs in the world of human experience as not real but apparent—to regard evil in its different forms as illusory. Hence there results an increasing tendency to disregard and depreciate the world of sense-experience and observed fact with its contradictions and maladjustments, in favor of an ideal sphere where everything is imagined to work in harmony with the realization of one supreme end. The spiritual world tends to become more and more an object of mystic vision, a Heavenly City, far removed in its perfection from the earthly scene. As such, the spiritual world becomes more and more completely divorced from the natural. The latter, from being merely apparent, becomes positively evil, its evil inhering, however, in its negativity. In this way, with the Stoics and Platonists, spiritual objects became supernatural

objects and the life devoted to their pursuit a supernatural life.

In the course of human history a new type of life thus arises which may appropriately be called *supernatural*. Supernatural, because those who professed it explicitly abandoned all natural "goods," wealth, fame, and bodily comfort, and devoted themselves entirely to the attainment of spiritual reality. Natural existence was esteemed only as furnishing the occasion and opportunity for rising to a supernatural life. In this higher life man identifies his will with ends which possess not future existence only, but eternal reality. Human volition seeks not merely to encompass the whole course of man's natural existence; it aspires to embrace the spiritual ideal in its unity and completeness. Once more, then, does the will of man seek a remedy for the disappointment and failure resulting from overconfidence, in the exercise of still greater faith; it prepares the way for a final vic-



tory over the ills of nature by transcending the sphere of natural existence altogether and converting it into a means for the realization of a more permanent and complete life.

Even if one fail to see why faith is needed to enable one to pursue the object of his momentary desire or to provide for his future security and comfort, no one will deny that faith is exercised by the man who sacrifices all natural goods in order to seek a spiritual ideal. If on the contrary, we do admit that it takes real initiative to enable a man to resist the attraction of surrounding objects, while he seeks to obtain an object which at the time is only an idea, and that it requires true courage to forego the assurance of present pleasure in order to pursue an end which lies in the uncertain future, how much more must we acknowledge that genuine heroism is displayed by one who renounces the whole natural world with its pressing actuality and prospect of substantial benefits for ends be-

longing to the world which his own spiritual vision has created! In the first stage of human progress man sacrifices the object of present perception to the end which his thought represents, in the second stage he sacrifices all the satisfactions which the present situation offers in order to pursue an end which his imagination projects into the future. But this future, while imaginary and uncertain, is nevertheless represented as continuous with the present, part of the same order, to be enacted in the same space, and joined to the present by the chain of natural causation. The third step which we are now considering, compels man to turn his back on the familiar world in which he has made himself at home, the world founded on the primary necessities of action and the use of his own physical organism. This world, whose actuality has become established and imperious, is to be renounced for another world, which is not as yet fully constituted and whose completion depends in part on the efforts of his own

will. The structure of the spiritual world is not forced upon his notice by conditions of his own acting; it is discovered by him after he has reflected upon the possibilities of satisfaction held forth by different objects. Nor can he depend upon his own experience of attainment to teach him of the value of objects; that will be far too limited. He must be able to discuss this subject with his fellows, considering the different purposes which objects subserve, and their varying degrees of comprehensiveness. Out of such discussion and the further reflection to which it leads, the realm of ends, the world of freedom, takes its rise. It is thus the creation of general intelligence: its objects, although they may be real, require for their discovery the exercise of conceptual thought. And when we consider that the human will at this stage is not content with devoting itself to those ideals which in some cases have been achieved and have had their value realized, but commits itself to the realization of that

end which is not merely spiritual, but a spiritual ideal, that of the Absolute Good, the All-comprehensive End, which when attained will yield every possible satisfaction, we see that it has required of itself a supreme courage, a sublime faith.

The faith upon which the supernatural life rests may be expressed in the form of a postulate. Human thought in this case postulates *the existence of a complete system of ends in whose permanent reality man can, through the exercise of his reason, participate.* The principle in question is, of course, that of *teleology*, since the relation which binds objects together in this spiritual system is that of means to end. The teleological principle is one that emphasizes the essential unity of humanity; for the ends with which it is concerned are, as universals, common to all individuals and witness the underlying unity of will among them. Because, moreover, these ends are included in a single comprehensive system, the individuals who realize them are joined in a

community of purpose. This spiritual system does not need the efforts of man to realize it, however; it already exists as a finished reality. Man has only to exercise his reason in order to understand this—to see things as they are, all comprehended within the system of universal spiritual reality. And since this spiritual system is the completed fulfilment of the Universal Will which manifests itself in each human individual, intellectual insight into the spiritual organization of the universe imparts permanent reality to the man who attains it, for it shows him all the possibilities of his own will completely realized.

The activity through which man expected to attain to supernatural reality was intellectual—the activity of conceptual thought. The supernatural life was regarded as an achievement of the reason common to all, exercised in free discussion, but rising to the full height of its powers in philosophical meditation. It is conceptual thought that distinguishes man from the

animals and enables him to discover universal characters whose permanent reality underlies the changing particulars of sense. It is conceptual thought which reveals to the human individual all the possibilities of satisfaction in a given situation and, at the same time, by showing to him his true nature as a man, enables him to take the course which promises most to enlarge the life of humanity. It is conceptual thought which discloses to man's vision the Absolute Spiritual Reality and enables him to welcome every event that occurs in his life as an expression of the Universal Purpose and, hence, the fulfilment of his own will. To make thought thus play the part of action in the attainment of an end may seem like a contradiction in terms, since we have understood by action adjustment to actual conditions, and thought deals only with the ideal. Still, actuality appears as the limiting or conditioning factor even in thought—if not as presented, at least as represented. Actuality appears in thought in

the form of ideas that have been verified and hence stand as facts. These ideas thus acquire the independence of actuality, the standing of established facts. To them our theories must adjust themselves, with them our speculative constructions must deal; and they may show a stubbornness and inadaptability which is equal to that of actual existence. Thus, as noted above, the constructive thought which endeavors to comprehend all reality within one teleological system finds an almost insuperable obstacle in the facts of sin and evil.

The end at which this intellectual activity aims is a life which attains supernatural reality because identified in thought and disposition with the universal spiritual system. Ideally, this means membership in a community of intelligence which is eternal, because founded upon teleological relationships which persist in spite of the transiency of particular things that manifest and exemplify them. While natural objects change and decay, the purposes they sub-

serve are permanent and enduring, because they are all comprehended within the one absolute purpose, which is the supreme reality. The supernatural life means, then, in the hopes of those who seek to achieve it, citizenship in a Heavenly City which abides in the face of all earthly dissolution and decay, a city which includes all humanity, or at least all men who rise to the possibilities of their rational selfhood. In actual practice the supernatural life has meant a life withdrawn from active pursuits, commercial and political, and devoted to rational reflection. Thus the ancient Stoics found the highest human good in the "life according to reason." Through reason alone, they believed, could man be freed from the evils and limitations of the natural life, since rational insight depended upon no gift of fortune and was always within the power of man as man. They, therefore, proposed to uproot from their natures those desires which required for their gratification the possession of material objects in order to pursue, undisturbed by earthly



events and emotional clamor, that intellectual activity which revealed to them the eternal realities. The supernatural life became in practice the life of the wise man secluded from the world and absorbed in his own thought. The Neo-Platonists, who followed the Stoics, went even further in their "other-worldliness," discarding thought as a source of insight into the nature of reality, because even its most general principles retained an element of definiteness and limitation, while Absolute Reality they held to be beyond limit or definition. Hence this later school placed above reason *feeling*, a state of emotional ecstasy which, they thought, must supervene, after reason had accomplished its uttermost, in order to reveal to man the Infinite Spiritual Reality. In the final step, the supernatural life is carried beyond the sphere of rational discussion, of intelligent communication, and made in its essence a mystical, an intuitional, an ineffable experience.

The intellectualism and other-worldliness

of the Stoic doctrine, however, did not prevent its resulting in notable practical achievement. For the Stoic "life according to reason" was understood as a "life according to nature," that is, a life according to the rational purpose controlling the world. But harmony with the Universal Purpose meant for the individual discharge of his vocation in the world; also it meant recognition of the equal rights of all human beings as alike expressions of the cosmic reason. Hence we find the Stoics laboring effectively for such political and social reforms as the extension of the rights of Roman citizenship to foreign peoples and the amelioration of the condition of slaves and serfs. In fact, the ancient Roman society presents no figure so noble, so sublime, as the Stoic, strengthened and poised by his spiritual vision, maintaining his philosophic calm, undisturbed by the allurements of vice, unaffrighted by the threats of tyrants, unshaken by suffering, torture, and death—a living demonstration of the

essential dignity of man as a rational being.

But this bold attempt of human volition once and for all to transcend the limitations of natural existence and to shake itself free from entanglement with changing, decaying matter did not succeed. Despising all natural goods, these brave souls proposed to make physical existence merely the occasion for entering upon a supernatural life. The fulfilment of this high purpose depended, nevertheless, upon the possession and use of physical existence. Hence, man's will while seeking a supernatural good could not free itself from dependence upon nature and natural existence. Man must at least exist as a natural being before he can attain supernatural reality. Although he proposes to use his physical existence merely as the occasion for gaining a foothold in the supernatural sphere, still it is indispensable as a foothold; without it he cannot so much as enter the spiritual kingdom. Moreover, the vast majority of men need more than bare existence, mere life, in

order even to seek spiritual goods. Bodily health, with some degree of comfort and leisure, must first exist before the powers of conceptual thought and constructive imagination required for the comprehension of spiritual principles, can be effectively exercised. There are exceptional cases, to be sure, of men possessed of great constitutional vigor, power of endurance, and strength of will, who are able to retain intellectual poise and continue philosophic meditation in spite of suffering due to disease or persecution or compulsory toil. But such cases are exceptional; most men require a measure of physical well-being before they can begin spiritual attainment. Hence the supernatural life fails in its attempt to escape altogether from natural evils. Indeed, it exposes itself in a special degree to the blighting effect of physical ills, for its very unwillingness to take care to provide for future health and comfort, its deliberate neglect of the conditions of physical well-being, which follow logi-

cally from its contempt for all natural goods, expose it in an exceptional way to interference and interruption from natural ills. The ills of the flesh, the pains of cold and hunger and disease, remind philosopher and saint that they are but men after all, and compel them to descend from the lofty heights of rational reflection and spiritual ecstasy to grovel in the mire of physical necessity. Nor does the seeker after supernatural goods free himself from the hostile influence of that other species of evil which has its source in the conflict of interests among human individuals. Despising as he does the physical enjoyments which other men seek, and endeavoring to eliminate from his character all those natural desires, including those instincts, sexual, parental, and social, which bind into fellowship the members of family and community, he is carried by his intellectual preoccupation more and more out of sympathy and understanding with the common run of men. The only other human

beings whom he deems worthy of his serious attention are those who are capable of entering into his thoughts and discussing the problems which absorb him. Hence a special form of selfishness is produced by supernaturalism, by other-worldliness—a spiritual pride, an exclusiveness and self-sufficiency which makes its exponents oblivious to the sufferings as well as to the worldly ambitions of their fellows and, in its final development, makes them willing to gain the comfort and ease favorable to spiritual culture, through the toil and privation of their fellows.

Certainly we should not be surprised to find that the faith which sustains the lofty aspirations of the supernatural life wavers in the face of such difficulties. Compelled by unavoidable physical ills to admit the stubborn, nay, the pressing reality of the natural world, it is not to be wondered at that men began to doubt of the reality of any other sphere. In a moment of spiritual vision men get a glimpse of a more

comprehensive and enduring reality and, filled with noble enthusiasm, they resolve to abandon all natural goods and find permanent home for their souls in the supernatural realm. But, in later years, after the exigencies of physical existence have forced them into constant entanglement with matter, the light fades from the objects of spiritual vision. The supernatural sphere becomes, in contrast to the material world, unreal and insubstantial; it seems only a fancy, made of the stuff dreams are made of—and faith in it fails. In such spiritual crises, when will seems in danger, through the failure of its ideals, of losing confidence in itself, we have found it drawing from religion new strength and courage. Thus it ever has been in human progress, and thus it was in the case of the supernatural life; we see those schools of ancient thought which had condemned all natural goods as transient and uncertain, and sought in the spiritual world for an abiding reality, turn in the closing centuries of the ancient era

to religion, in the hope of strengthening their failing faith. They looked to religion for some divine revelation which should demonstrate the reality of the spiritual world. They felt the need of a revelation which should come with authority, not the kind of authority possessed by the conclusions of human reason, but an authority witnessed in the physical world by signs and wonders, by divine interpositions and miraculous happenings. Consequently, men of high purpose and philosophic training in the Græco-Roman world interested themselves in various Oriental religions, desiring to receive from the miracles and wonders which their exponents related or were reputed to perform some convincing evidence of the existence and power of the supernatural. Most promising of all these religions was that of the Hebrews. For the Jewish scriptures professed to reveal not only the character of the supreme spiritual being, but also to record its successive appearances to men. The superiority of such



historic revelation to any philosophical argument in convincing men of the existence of the supernatural, and in arousing them to the pursuit of spiritual goods, could not be gainsaid. An attempt was actually made to combine Greek philosophy with Hebrew theology; a curious system of beliefs was formulated in which the Hebrew God with the archangels and angels who do his will, was identified with the Platonic hierarchy of ideas.

It was the Christian religion, however, whose advent at a critical time supplied the doctrine of the supernatural life with that reinforcement necessary to convert it into one of the great civilizing influences in the world's history. To the ancient world which was seeking in vain some support for its waning faith in spiritual values, Christianity came with its message of an authoritative revelation of supernatural reality. The authority of this revelation was attested, its exponents maintained, by the supernatural origin of Jesus, by the mira-

cles he performed, by his resurrection from the dead. It was further witnessed by the miracles and theophanies of the Hebrew dispensation, culminating as this was said to do, in Jesus, the promised Messiah. In content Christianity was a revelation of the nature and will of God. In the person and teaching of Christ, God was revealed as a Spirit possessed of infinite reality and absolute moral perfection. The lofty ethical monotheism which developed out of the Hebrew religion after it had been purified in the fire of national calamity and refined by ages of religious meditation, received in the life and death of Jesus an expression sufficiently dramatic and appealing to win in the course of a few centuries the attention of the civilized world. This fresh revelation of supernatural reality was eagerly seized upon by ancient society, sick as it was of the natural world and its transient joys, and yearning for an abiding spiritual home. It was of necessity interpreted by Greek and Roman thinkers in terms of their

own thought, *i. e.*, the conceptions of Greek philosophy. God was characteristically conceived in the Hebrew religion as sharply separated by his personality and moral will from the natural world. This the divine transcendence, taught as a matter of course by the Christian gospel, was interpreted in terms of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy. God's moral perfection was understood as his freedom from all entanglement with matter—his pure immateriality. The need for a mediator was then apparent if this transcendent deity was to exert any influence upon the material world. This was the office assigned to Jesus: he was identified with the Logos, the divine reason immanent in the world.

Here, then, was a God whose existence guaranteed the reality of the spiritual world. For supernaturalism conceives the spiritual world not dynamically but statically, as a complete, an eternal, a perfected whole. It is, therefore, absolutely divorced from the natural world, where everything

changes and nothing is final. Between the two worlds, lower and higher, is fixed a gulf of absolute opposition. The one is irretrievably material, the other is triumphantly spiritual; the one is changing, the other permanent; the one is fragmentary, the other complete; the one is discordant, the other harmonious. In order that supernaturalism should enlist in its service all the resources of religious faith, the dualism in question had to find expression in a new conception of God. This was achieved by mediæval Christianity, when it conceived of God as characterized essentially by his purity, his freedom from any stain or limitation of matter. To the attributes of power and justice, which in preceding stages of religious evolution had been ascribed to God, was now added *holiness*. This quality overshadowed the other two, expressing as it did God's essential and perfect spirituality. Converting the ideals of supernaturalism into the sovereign reality, this conception of God trans-

formed at one stroke an idealistic philosophy, comprehensible only to a select few, into a potent moralizing force.

Christianity offered to all men salvation from the sins and sorrows of the natural life and assurance of eternal reality. The plan of salvation had its source in the purpose of God, for Him completely realized; it was revealed and executed by Christ, the divinely appointed mediator. With the mediæval theory of salvation, the philosophy of the Incarnation and Atonement then formulated and standardized, we are not here concerned. For us it is sufficient to note that through faith in Christ and compliance with the requirements of the Church, the authorized representative of Christ on earth, the human individual was supposed to obtain divine grace sufficient to save him from the destruction that awaits everything earthly, and to secure his adoption into the spiritual kingdom. Once saved from the evils of the natural life, the interest of man was withdrawn from earthly

concerns and centred upon the spiritual world. He was encouraged to neglect worldly affairs and to abandon natural goods; he was led to look upon this world as a temporary halting-place in his pilgrimage to a heavenly home. Commerce and industry ceased, therefore, to appeal; social relationships (except those of ecclesiastical origin) lost their significance. Material advancement ceased; social progress was checked. Religion with its direct outlook upon the supernatural was regarded as the proper vocation of man, and the true religious life was understood to be that of secluded meditation and prayer.

However unreal the natural world may appear, however insignificant its happenings when contrasted with the abiding reality and eternal significance of the supernatural, nevertheless nature does exist and the events of human history have occurred. As actual facts they demand from the exponent of supernaturalism some explanation in terms of his own faith. This ex-

planation was furnished in the cosmology and philosophy of history formulated by the early Christian fathers and theologians. In accounting for the existence of the natural world, mediæval theology adopted the cosmogony of the Hebrew scriptures. The world was created out of nothing by God in six days; each distinct form of life was specially created; man was made by God in His own image, designed thus to be the lord of all creation. For man, the Divine Creator made special laws, obedience to which would insure him of a life of perfect bliss. But tempted by Satan, a fallen angel who had led in rebellion against the authority of the Most High, the first man Adam disobeyed God's law, fell from divine grace, and incurred the punishment of sin. The curse of sin was transmitted from our first parents to the whole human race. All men are born depraved; consequently they suffer the fatigue of constant and often unavailing toil, the pain of disability and disease, the fear of certainly impending death.

Hence the melancholy record of human history; of man's futile strivings for power and pleasure, of his unspeakable cruelties to his fellow-man, of his degradation and bestiality, of his grovelling terror and indescribable sufferings. But God did not entirely withdraw his favor from man; His eternal purpose which embraced man's creation and his fall included, also, a plan for his salvation. Thus in a world enveloped in the darkness of sin a feeble light was kindled and kept burning, handed down the line of Hebrew patriarchs and prophets until the divinely appointed time when it should blaze forth and illuminate the world. This time, the turning-point in the world's history, was that of the birth of Christ, who was the Son of God and took on human flesh in order to save men from the curse of sin. Through His life and teachings, Christ revealed the will of God to man; through His death, He made the necessary atonement for human sin. Thenceforth the way was opened for man



to escape from all the ills of natural existence and obtain eternal life. The body of Christ's followers, organized as the Christian Church, continued as His representative on earth. Thus the Church became the visible embodiment of the supernatural reality ; her authority was supreme over all temporal powers, all earthly kingdoms; she held the keys of heaven, for through her sacraments only came that divine grace necessary for human regeneration and sanctification. In the life of the Church, in fact, as the communion of those saved and sustained by divine grace, man enters that supernatural life which is not terminated but rather fulfilled by physical death. The mediæval philosophy of history, thus barely outlined, gives to the faith and ideals of the supernatural life their final historic expression. There is something majestic in the sweep of this, the first real philosophy of human history; the tale it tells is sombre enough, but dramatic in its idyllic opening, its tragic plot, its

tremendous dénouement, and possessed through its startling contrasts and remorseless consistency of a grandeur really awesome. The imagination is stirred by the thought of the Christian sage who, in the closing years of the Roman Empire, with civilization crumbling beneath his feet, with disorder and carnage all about him, surveys with untroubled eye the whole course of human history from creation until the end of the world. Looking back over the recent period of ancient history to remoter prehistoric times, he sees in the rise and fall of kingdoms nothing but the vain and futile strivings of the Empire of This World, necessarily transient and marked by sin and sorrow. Turning his gaze forward and peering into the future, which to the natural vision is dark and menacing, with its threat of barbarian inundation and civilization extinguished, his eye remains serene and untroubled, for his spiritual vision foresees the triumphant progress of the Church, the City of God, in her vic-

torious warfare with all worldly principalities and powers.

Thus the thought of mediæval Christianity found the key to the meaning of universal history in the divine plan of redemption. In perfect consistency with the standpoint of supernaturalism, it was in this way enabled to explain all existing facts teleologically, through their bearing upon the supreme concern of man's salvation. Causal determination, which for naturalism was a sufficient explanation of everything that happened, was by supernaturalism almost entirely ignored. In the causal sequences which relate natural events among themselves, supernaturalism had little if any interest, and not the slightest tendency to explore them; these events occurred only to fulfil God's will, and this divine purpose furnished their complete explanation. Such objects and events as could not by any stretch of the imagination be thought of as means to the one great end were interpreted as emblems or symbols of

great spiritual truths connected with human redemption. No more striking exemplification can be found of the power of an intellectual presupposition completely to dominate human thought and to exclude all other interests. Blind to the most elementary facts of nature, mediæval thought found food for endless speculation in its supposed symbolism. The eagle, the dove, the serpent, the lion, about whose structures and life-habits there was profoundest ignorance, were nevertheless dwelt upon as symbols of spiritual objects and spiritual processes. The sea, about whose boundaries, depths, and tides next to nothing was known, was interesting as a symbol of the human heart tossed about by gusts of passion, traversed by waves of impulse.

Of the faults of supernaturalism little more need be said. The type of life encouraged by its principles and ideals has already been indicated. With all its faults, it has a splendor of its own, witnessing as it does to the power of the ideal over the

human soul. While its one-sidedness and exaggeration doomed it to certain decay, it constitutes a necessary stage in human progress, since it achieved results of permanent value. It enlarged the horizons of human life by creating for the will of man the ideal of a spiritual good, an eternal life, which in spite of his return to nature and worldly pursuits he can never forget nor cease to yearn after. Nor should the efficacy of supernaturalism as a civilizing agency during the dark ages of transition and turmoil be overlooked or underestimated. For those who were permitted by circumstances to make the most of their spiritual opportunities in pursuit of a religious vocation, it meant, as we have seen, withdrawal from the life of action and of service to the seclusion of the monastery, where free from all worldly distractions they could continue by meditation and by prayer to fit themselves for the heavenly life. Action entered these cloistered lives only in connection with the ritual and ser-

vice of the Church. Such a life, pursued by all members of the race, would of course have brought human existence and with it human progress to a speedy close. But, fortunately, the great majority of men could not thus make religion a vocation. It was, rather, an addition to their everyday lives—lives that in those turbulent times were vivid and absorbing enough. Moreover, the barbarians of northern Europe, whom it was the mission of the Church to educate and civilize, did not possess powers of reflective thought or logical formulation sufficient to give such ideas of spiritual reality as they might be led to form any revolutionary significance. Their natural interest in the world of every-day affairs was not disturbed by the beliefs they acquired concerning the supernatural. The supernatural world was to them another world added to this one—a celestial realm, it is true, but in fundamental structure analogous to the life on earth. God was its monarch, mightier than any earthly poten-

tate, but resembling in all essentials the monarchs of this world. But the existence of the celestial world and the prospect of a supernatural life furnished powerful incentives to right conduct—and this was a very important matter.

As an attempt to provide complete and final satisfaction for the human will, the supernatural life did not, even with the reinforcement of religious belief, succeed. The problem of evil, still unsolved, remained as the reef destined to wreck this third type of life with its high pretensions and lofty ideals. The attempt of mediæval Christianity to overcome actual evils, natural and social, by ignoring them was an utter failure. Inattention to natural objects and ignorance of natural laws brought a heavy penalty of suffering and degradation. Disease raged unchecked because the laws of health were neglected; famine threatened because the methods of production were unimproved; disasters from fire and flood and storm were unabated, be-

cause ignorance of natural causes made precaution and prevention impossible. Thus supernaturalism as a mode of living defeated its own ends, for many lives with splendid spiritual possibilities were prematurely cut off, or spiritually deadened, by hardship and pain. In the social sphere, also, the inability of supernaturalism to remove the conflict of interests among individuals and bring about a fair adjustment, proved destructive of its own aims. Its failure to establish social justice is notorious; it encouraged the growth of spiritual aristocracy, and ultimately of a social aristocracy as well. Unable to pursue the life of worship and prayer and communion which the religious vocation required, unless freed from the toil and care of providing for physical sustenance and comfort, those who were prompted to seek the fruits of the spiritual life grew increasingly willing to receive their support from the labor of the greater number who were condemned to toil unceasingly, without opportunity for a



rudimentary spiritual culture. And when this spiritual aristocracy found it could make its position more secure politically by alliance with an hereditary social aristocracy which gained the chance for intellectual and æsthetic culture through subjecting the mass of men to the limitations of inferior social status, and then appropriating the products of their labor, it did not hesitate to do so. Nay more, the representatives of supernaturalism were willing to strengthen the authority of a corrupt social aristocracy by hypocritically admonishing the subject classes to be content with their lot, since earthly possessions and pleasures were transient and unreal, while heavenly bliss was the sure reward of every man who proved submissive to the powers of Church and state. Become thus the apologist for social injustice, supernaturalism was certain to fall, and its fall was deserved.

But supernaturalism is not simply superseded in the onward march of human

progress. Its results are assimilated; they become a permanent acquisition of human nature. Man, upon whom the spiritual vision has once dawned, never entirely escapes from its uplifting influence. The light of the eternal, having once shone upon the scene of earth, leaves it with altered perspective and enlarged horizons. The appeal of the supernatural may only be felt on special occasions, but it leaves us permanently uplifted and ennobled. Perhaps it is when we behold some sublime natural spectacle or simply view a peaceful sunset sky, possibly it is when we are stirred by the beauty and majesty of a great cathedral or join joyfully in the worship of Christmas or Easter tide—on such rare occasions the concerns of every-day life retreat into the background of shadow and our souls rise up and lay hold on eternal reality.

## CHAPTER V

### THE UNIVERSAL LIFE

HUMAN progress is due to the irresistible expansive power of the human will; undaunted by failure, it turns every defeat into a victory by striving with renewed faith to conquer and annex still more extensive fields of satisfaction. Failing to obtain the objects of present desire, it seeks to make sure of future well-being and enjoyment. Thwarted in this attempt to provide for future security and comfort, it abandons the natural world in an heroic attempt to attain an abiding supernatural good. Unable thus to take heaven by storm, it endeavors to realize an end which shall unite both natural and supernatural goods—aiming in this new venture at once to convert material acquisitions into a means of spiritual attainment, and to de-

rive from spiritual sources power for the transformation of natural conditions. This final end, which may fitly be termed *universal*, is sought by the modern spirit.

It is easy to misunderstand the modern spirit as merely a relapse into naturalism. For we seem to see the modern world absorbed in an attempt to secure material convenience and enjoyment through the control of physical forces and the direction of social influences. But this interpretation stops at the surface and utterly fails to understand the great underlying principles of modern civilization. The modern spirit differs from naturalism, first in the ideal which it proposes for realization, and, second, in the method by which it undertakes to realize this ideal.

The ideal of modern civilization is not limited, like that of naturalism, to the satisfactions of individual existence and community life. The good which it seeks extends in its range beyond the narrow boundaries of local community interest to the

larger national life, and the life of the modern nation presents a variety of activities almost endless and a complexity of interests well-nigh infinite. But it overleaps, also, the limits of national welfare, and embraces international comity and well-being, extending thus to the lives of all men of every race and clime. Nor does it confine itself to the humanity of the present age or generation, but has regard for man's development and satisfaction throughout the long reaches of the future. Man's effort to attain by sheer force of spiritual insight to a supernatural reality proves to be not a disorderly dream, forgotten on awakening; it leaves him with an outlook permanently altered. For the human will in the broad light of modern day still seeks a spiritual kingdom, not a Heavenly City perhaps, but a spiritual community whose life shall furnish to every man the opportunity for personal development and satisfaction. Moreover, Christian other-worldliness and asceticism have left their permanent mark upon

the moral will of the modern man; for deep-rooted in his heart the conviction abides that the highest human good has a content so comprehensive, so far-reaching, as to demand the surrender of every individual interest. The profound Christian doctrine of self-sacrifice is firmly intrenched in modern ethics. Modern humanitarianism is occasionally disparaged as visionary and sentimental, as the well-meant but absurdly impracticable proposal to make everybody materially prosperous and happy. But to treat with superior or cynical disdain this ideal, even in its cruder expressions, is to play the traitor to man's highest interest, for in its universalism it represents the noblest aspiration of the human will.

In the method of realizing its ideal, modernism returns to grapple anew with physical forces and social conditions. Here we do have a return to naturalism—but with a noteworthy difference. The natural man seeks, through observing and utilizing the

obvious sequences of nature, to reach the results at which he aims. Modern intelligence, on the contrary, proposes through study and experiment to analyze physical forces and social tendencies into their elementary components, and then to recombine them in such a way that they shall with unfailing certainty produce the results which universal human welfare requires.

Modern civilization is the vastest enterprise ever undertaken by the human will. Supernaturalism was a bold venture, it is true; it wins our admiration through the very height of its pretensions. But since the supernatural good was exalted far above all worldly events and concerns, it took on an exclusive character, shutting out from its ken the disturbing refractory forces of nature and all such human individuals as possessed neither intellectual grasp nor spiritual insight. Its ideal was the life of a spiritual aristocracy. In contrast to this, the end sought by the moral will which is behind modern civilization appalls by its

very scope and magnitude. It proposes to utilize every natural force, every social influence, in the establishment of a social community whose life shall be large and varied enough to provide for the development and satisfaction of every human individual. Here in this final stage of human progress we behold the human will venturing to seek a life which is truly universal.

The faith which the pursuit of such a universal good calls for on the part of modern man is greater than that hitherto exercised by the human will. The faith characteristic of supernaturalism is noble, ardent, pure—surpassing in these qualities any previous aspiration of man. This noble purity, this consuming zeal, is the result of whole-souled devotion to a sublime spiritual ideal. But supernaturalism is able to continue absorbed in its lofty ideal only because it deliberately disregards a large part of human experience. Its exalted optimism is achieved only through blindness to the ills and imperfections of the actual



world. A faith stronger than that of Stoic sage or mediæval mystic is, therefore, required of one who faces the facts of the existing world, who understands its contradictions and maladjustments, its cruel and clumsy processes, its bloodshed and carnage, its brutality and cunning; and yet dares to believe that it may be made a means to the realization of a universal spiritual ideal. To look without flinching upon the facts of existence, to maintain the possibility of converting the agencies of nature into instruments of personal development and to undertake the task of realizing the Ideal in the actual world, calls for a faith so resolute, a fortitude so unfaltering as to daunt any but the strongest will.

The postulate through which this faith gains expression is that of development or evolution—that *the actual world contains potencies of adaptation and growth, of which human intelligence may avail itself in the establishment of a universal spiritual life.*

This is the last and highest of the four postulates upon which human progress rests. Primitive life depends upon belief in the existence of things which are centres and sources of characteristic qualities. The natural life owes its advance over primitive conditions to the further belief that events are determined in their occurrence by previous events, their causes. The supernatural life is made possible by the added belief to which reflection gives rise, that objects and events owe their character to the ends they subserve. The universal life rests upon a final and culminating belief in development or self-determination—a belief that objects derive actuality and significance not simply from the causes which produce them or from the ends which they subserve, but also from their own intrinsic potencies of growth and expression; that actual objects are in a real and important sense self-caused in that they are capable, under stress of inner tension or outer stimulus, of manifesting new qualities and powers.

This capacity for growth and self-development is strikingly manifested in the organic realm by the multitude of forms and the variety of activities originated by the life-force—forms and activities which in appearance are new and, from previous observation, unpredictable. But this capacity for self-development comes first to full expression as the power of freedom and creativity in the mind and will of man. It is the principle of progress itself, and its final adoption as a ruling belief by the human will means that the spirit of progress has finally become self-conscious. Explicitly adopted as a postulate, it means that the human will has come to conscious recognition of its power of originating new ends for pursuit and of discovering in actual objects and conditions new possibilities of service and satisfaction.

Human volition, at the present high-water mark of its development, thus aims at such adjustment of forces in nature and such organization of interests in society as

will make possible the establishment of a universal social life. This is pre-eminently a programme of action, and it is a fact that modern civilization is distinguished from mediævalism by its abandonment of contemplation for action. In its emphasis upon accomplishment and efficiency the modern spirit harks back to the "practicality" of naturalism, and seems to the exponent of classical culture to savor not a little of the Philistinism of the natural man. But, as we have seen, there is this important difference: the action required by the modern ideal is not a comparatively simple routine based upon empirical observation, but is experimental and constructive, because guided by systematic reflection and creative imagination. In fact, the achievements of modern civilization in the subjugation of nature and the reorganization of society are due directly to developed thought and trained imagination, a development and a training which man's intellectual and imaginative faculties received

during the classical and mediæval periods. For if man is to make new combinations of natural forces which shall produce results serviceable to himself, he must first be able to separate these forces, operating in a baffling complexity, into their elementary constituents. To do this he must not merely observe, he must experiment. But in order to experiment he must be able beforehand to frame in his thought the questions whose answer he is to seek from nature. Now to ask intelligent questions requires an initial conception of a subject or situation and a provisional analysis of it. Such exercise of conceptual thought and analytic understanding lies, consequently, at the very source of modern technical achievement. Kepler's epoch-making discovery of the laws which govern planetary revolution was made possible by his initial conception of the universe as ordered by definite quantitative relations. Proceeding upon this view and with a knowledge of mathematical principles, he attempted to conceive of

every possible relation that might apply to the orbit of the planets. This provisional analysis supplied him with a set of hypotheses, each of which might constitute a question to which observed facts would return answer. An observation, thus originating in an hypothesis and returning answer to a question, is essentially experimental. When the conditions under which an event occurs are so controlled that any observer may vary them at will, thus testing every conceivable hypothesis in regard to their relation to the event in question, we have, in the complete sense of the term, an experiment.

This work of separating the forces of nature into their elementary constituents, and of determining their essential relations, is, of course, but a preliminary to the task of recombining them in such ways that they may produce results which increase the satisfaction and enlarge the scope of human life. In this field of invention, mechanical and social, the will of man has scored its

most notable triumphs in modern times. New machinery of production and distribution, of transportation and communication, has revolutionized the economic and industrial life of man; new agencies of government and education, of relief and recreation, have reorganized his social life. There is no fitter symbol of modern progress than the machine. To assert this is, in the opinion of many people, tantamount to a condemnation of modernism. The prominence of machinery in modern life they regard as an ominous indication that human society is being materialized. Such is a mistaken view, however; the invention and use of machinery means, or should mean, not that human life is being materialized, but that the material world is being spiritualized. For what does the invention of a useful machine signify? It means that physical forces, which have hitherto acted separately and without regard for human welfare, are so combined and adjusted by human intelligence as to produce a new

result, and one that is desired by man to enrich the content of his life. It means that a number of physical forces, each of which has always been and continues to be determined by other forces, quite regardless of man's needs or purposes, are bound together by a new relationship which man imposes upon them when he makes them means to one end. In this way the uncertainty, the untrustworthiness of natural processes which rendered futile man's previous attempts to avail himself of their causal sequences in providing for his own future, and finally made him despair of attaining any natural good, is overcome. For this earlier effort of man to control nature in his own interest had for its guidance only his observation of the more obvious sequences of natural events—an observation that necessarily failed to reveal all the conditions of an event, to detect those that were hidden, and to distinguish the part played by each. Hence the effect that he expected would follow, and upon



which his own plans depended, was continually failing to appear, because of the absence of some necessary condition of which he was ignorant. He knew that the growth of the seed he had planted was conditioned by a loosening of the soil and the presence of moisture and heat and light, but he did not know that the existence of certain elements in the soil was also a necessary condition. Hence his crop often failed unaccountably, and in consequence he went hungry. But modern science, by its exact analysis of all the conditions under which natural events occur is giving man certain control, and the assurance of success, in obtaining results from nature. Now the machine represents this control in the acme of perfection. For here exact analysis is made the basis of a new synthesis or readjustment of natural forces, with the sole purpose of obtaining from them a certain result. The machine typifies, therefore, the conquest of matter by intelligence—its genuine spiritualization. It is not

merely that natural processes are subjected to a new kind of determination, however; that certain forces which were determined before by antecedent conditions are now determined by subsequent events, by results, that is, which now they are bound to produce. That kind of teleology is already present in nature, inasmuch as every event is not merely the effect of a cause, but determined itself to produce an effect. No, in the machine the action of natural forces is also determined by their inherent, but as yet unrealized, potencies of rendering intelligent service. The invention of machinery is a contribution to universal progress because by it the material universe is made to display capabilities hitherto unknown, of furthering the development of self-conscious personality.

The co-operation of thought with action in extending the control of man over the forces of his natural environment has produced results extremely advantageous to thought itself, and stimulating to its devel-

opment. For, among other achievements, modern invention has devised appliances for experiment and investigation which have led to an enormous increase in man's intellectual power. Modern invention has given to science the laboratory with its marvellous apparatus for discovering the hidden secrets of nature. Laboratory instruments and procedure make possible the exhaustive analysis and precise measurement of natural forces. They are enabling scientists to reduce all changes in the physical universe to terms of motion, and to measure the direction and velocity of this motion. This translation of the natural world, with its multitude of objects varying in interest and significance into mechanical terms, fills many minds with apprehension and dismay. It seems to them to mean the elimination of all value and freedom from our human world and its replacement by matter and mechanism, the veritable shackling of man in the iron chains of physical necessity. But the true idealist whose first concern is

the real spiritual progress of humanity has no cause for alarm or regret; rather should he welcome the advance of exact physical science. For the reduction of all natural change to terms of motion means that all physical processes can be formulated in mathematical terms, their fundamental laws and relations made out—can, in fact, be calculated and controlled. Modern physical science is thus preparing the way for the complete conquest of matter by rational will. The progress of laboratory science proves, if you will, that nature, as it now exists, is not spiritual—but who that esteems spiritual values would wish to admit that it is! But it does give us reason to hope that the natural world may by effort and contrivance be spiritualized—and this is all that the true idealist could desire.

Modern civilization seeks to attain its end through the instrumentality of both thought and action. These two capacities become, therefore, fully spiritualized, for they are both made means to the develop-

ment of a universal personal life. It is true that supernaturalism conceived of thought as an agency for realizing an Absolute Good: the exercise of reason was believed to reveal to man the Absolute Truth and to show him his place in Universal Reality. But this truth was conceived abstractly, and the reality which it revealed was one divorced from the facts of human experience. The exercise of reason has not been neglected by the modern spirit; devotion to pure science has been a leading characteristic of modern civilization. But modern thought has sought to discover the facts of the actual world, and in this undertaking it has met with astonishing success. Its ultimate aim is Absolute Truth, to be sure; a completed system of ideas which shall represent every real object. The facts of the existing world do not permit of such representation, however, until they have been brought actually within the scope of personal life, and to accomplish this is the task of action. And it is man's power of action, however,

that has undergone the most remarkable expansion in modern times. This capacity was neglected and despised by supernaturalism, as we have seen. In the still lower stage, when man was interested altogether in obtaining and enjoying natural goods, it was limited to the employment of a few natural forces and the fashioning of relatively simple tools. Hence the tendency still exists to disparage this faculty as of solely utilitarian value, and as having no place in true personal development. But to take this view is to blind oneself to the most notable achievement of modern times. For the modern world has seen technical activity raised to the level of personal achievement by being given a universal scope and significance. The aim of modern invention in both the mechanical and the social fields is to make such adjustments and adaptations of existing materials and forces as shall turn them into means of universal human development. Such are railways and steamships, which make possible whole-

sale transportation; telegraph and telephone, which facilitate general communication; such are postal service, public school system, labor unions, state insurance, etc.—all permanent instruments of human betterment. Thus the man who invents a new coupling device, a new serum, an improved method of street-cleaning, realizes not a material but a spiritual good; for through his action his will is identified with the universal social life. Feeling, whose contribution to human progress is often forgotten, has also become in modern times an agency of universal progress. The yearning of the human will for an absolute and eternal good was a potent influence in leading men to abandon all natural interests in order to seek a supernatural good. The feeling which inspires the modern servant of humanity is no less noble, if less ecstatic. Its scope is, in fact, more truly universal, because more genuinely comprehensive; it is a broad and fundamental sympathy with humanity universally, a su-

preme enthusiasm for human development, and a profound interest in every action which promises to further this end.

Returning now to the end sought by the moral will which is moving in modern civilization, we have found ample reason for regarding it as spiritual. It is spiritual because it represents the complete satisfaction of the human will in the greatest possible expansion of man's personality. This life is universal because it comprehends, in the sense of making room for, the personal development of every human individual. This ideal of modern humanitarianism was, of course, foreshadowed by the Stoic conception of a perfect society and the mediæval ideal of a spiritual kingdom. But these former ideals are static—the perfect society, the spiritual community which they envisaged was one already realized by the will of God, and elevated in its eternal perfection far above the confused and fragmentary existence of earth. The modern ideal is, on the contrary, *dynamic*, is that



of an expanding spiritual system, a developing society of free persons. It exists not realized, but *to be* realized. It is the object not of contemplation but of action; it promises not the peace of fulfilment but the sword of adventure and achievement. Thus the modern moral ideal has received concrete embodiment in the aims of *Democracy*—aims which begin, with much hesitation and after many discouragements, to be realized.

The aim of democracy is to give equal opportunities for self-expression and satisfaction to all its citizens. It seeks to establish a social life which shall furnish to every individual who participates in it full scope for personal development; the individual in rendering his service to society gains complete self-realization. This means that the will of each individual shall achieve the maximum of expansion in the three fields of its exercise—thought, action, and feeling. All citizens will therefore share in the attainment of the supreme personal good

in its threefold expression, as Truth and Power and Beauty. These ends are by nature universal; they can be attained only in a community of intelligence; they imply the associated activity of a community of free persons. The ideal of democracy is thus that of a "perfect society." But this ideal can be realized only under the actual conditions of human existence; it is the great achievement of the modern spirit to have recognized this fundamental fact. The forces of nature must be so controlled and employed as to furnish all individuals with the means of health and comfort; the varied and conflicting interests of individuals must be so adjusted as to make due place for the legitimate activity of each one. Now, democracy will not permit the burden of this, the work of the world, to fall upon the shoulders of one class of its citizens, in order that another shall be given leisure and freedom for higher personal development. Such an arrangement would violate its fundamental principle of

universal and equal opportunity. No, democracy, on the contrary, insists that the weight of the world's work shall be borne by all. Its only recourse, therefore, if it is to realize its ideal under conditions of earth, is so to organize the work of economic production and social adjustment that it may yield to all participants the absolute moral values above mentioned. Truth and Power and Beauty, expressions of that universal life for which his will yearns, must be discovered and attained by man in the course of his every-day occupations, in sowing and reaping, in building and carrying, in buying and selling, in teaching and healing. This task, which the hard facts of existence impose upon the will of man, modern civilization believes to be possible of attainment. Our democratic societies give evidence that it is at least possible to realize the ideal by idealizing the actual. A wide dissemination of knowledge made possible by popular education and free discussion is found to facilitate industry and government, besides being

a permanent means of self-expression with citizens; a large increase of power over forces both physical and social, due to the co-operative use of machinery, has resulted in a great improvement of man's living conditions, besides giving to his activity that added range and scope which it ever craves; a great extension of sympathy, due to mutual understanding and co-operation, has made men more helpful as fellow laborers and more agreeable as fellow citizens, besides opening inexhaustible sources of satisfaction in the appreciation of beauty in nature and in character. The three supreme ideals, as they are concretely realized in a democratic society, appear as mutual understanding, co-operation, and sympathy.

*Mutual understanding* is the very cornerstone of democracy. It is possible to found a stable society which shall subserve moral ends because expressing the general will only when there is general enlightenment and understanding. Knowledge, to be morally effective, to promote personal develop-

ment universally, cannot remain the exclusive possession of a few; it must become the common property of all. Hence, while the scientific expert must be employed by a democratic society, he will be compelled to explain his methods and justify his results to his fellow citizens. The only way in which a man with special knowledge can gain exceptional influence is by persuading the public of the truth of his views, or at least of his competence to decide. Free discussion and popular education are the life's breath of democracy. Modern intelligence and technical skill have been amazingly successful in the contrivance of methods and the invention of machinery for the dissemination of knowledge. The extension of the franchise, safe only where there is an equal extension of knowledge, is itself a notable educational measure; for it gives to the ignorant an occasion and incentive for the acquisition of information, and impels those who know to enlighten their less intelligent fellows. Political campaigns and

elections, awakening general interest in large national questions and leading to public discussions and debates, are effective agencies for the spread of ideas and the increase of understanding. The public-school system is the mainstay of popular government, insuring that benefits gained by society in the present shall be conserved and enlarged by future generations. Public libraries, with their stores of books and periodicals for general use, the modern newspaper, with its marvellous facilities for the gathering and publication of news, assist in this work of enlightenment. Railways and steamboats, making travel speedy and comfortable, enable people to meet, converse, and keep in personal touch with one another. Improved postal service, the telegraph, and the telephone are additional instruments of communication which aid in the great work of promoting general knowledge and mutual understanding. Merely an enumeration of methods and agencies is sufficient to show one how vast and how

successful is the work of education and enlightenment carried on by a modern democratic society. And the result attained—general knowledge of the facts of life and the world, with an understanding of the points of view of other men—is a permanent means of self-development and satisfaction.

*Co-operation* is the second feature necessary to the life of a democratic society, but possessed, also, of supreme moral worth. It is plain that the work of modern democracy in the economic and social fields can be carried on only through the co-operative effort of its citizens. It is also apparent that co-operation of hand if not of soul does prevail in modern industry and government. To the division of labor which gave to different individuals different occupations there has been added, through the introduction of machinery, a differentiation of function much more minute and thoroughgoing, organizing workers into groups within groups, and giving to the individual the

most definite and specialized of tasks. The work of government in a great democracy has also become so immensely enlarged and exceedingly intricate as to be saved from confusion only by an elaborate organization which involves at once highest specialization and completest interdependence. Modern society has secured at least the semblance of co-operation in its industrial and political organization, but it is to be feared that the co-operation is in most cases a matter of outward form and does not touch the inner soul and spirit. The division of labor required by the use of machinery along with modern factory methods too often merely condemns the individual to the monotonous repetition of an utterly insignificant task, without producing in him any realizing sense of the power and efficiency of the whole enterprise to which he contributes. It is one of the pressing duties of democracy to remedy this condition, and so to reorganize its industries and enterprises that their working shall yield this fundamental moral



value. This end will not be gained by the abandonment of machinery and the methods of manufacture and transportation to which its employment have led. On the contrary, it is in the invention of more machinery and the further extension of its use that the hope of reaching an ultimate solution of the problem chiefly lies. For we may hope that in time all the dangerous and deadening tasks may be given over to machinery; no class of unfortunates will be compelled by circumstances to perform them. The work of men, in the sphere of industry and commerce at least, will consist almost entirely in the control of machinery, and this work they must do together. With the conditions of labor improved and the mode of living bettered, it remains to produce among the workers the spirit of co-operation. A movement in this direction seems to be developing out of the recent efficiency propaganda. For it is seen with increasing clearness that efficiency cannot be secured by attention to physical

factors alone, by the elimination of all waste of power and material. The human factor must also be considered—the personality of the workers must be taken into account. Each individual must be given the task most congenial to his taste and fitted to his ability; then he must be encouraged to make the most of its possibilities. But most of all, industries must be so managed as to enlist the interest and arouse the loyalty of the workers. They must come to feel a sense of personal ownership in the machinery, to be thrilled by its power, to take satisfaction in its productions. To this consciousness they have a moral right, because the machinery is an invention of human intelligence, an achievement of the rational will which is striving in all men. When the individual thus identifies the industry or enterprise with his own will his fellow workers become his partners, united not by their common antagonism to those who “own” or direct the enterprise, but by their common interest in and devotion to it.

In this way the life of the individual becomes truly universalized; his powers of action receive their rightful satisfaction through participating in the successful effort of man's intelligence to control the conditions of his existence.

Besides general enlightenment and reciprocal service, a whole-hearted *sympathy* among fellow citizens is implied in the very existence of democracy. With the development of a democratic society this fellow-feeling broadens and deepens, and it is manifestly to the interest of such society to encourage and foster this growth until it becomes the genuine emotion of brotherhood. There is no more effective method of promoting the concord of feeling among all sorts and conditions of men than by enabling them to enjoy together the same beauties in works of nature and of art. For a distinguishing feature of the feeling of æsthetic appreciation is its disinterestedness. The sense of beauty is awakened by harmonies and proportions in objects that

appeal to the perceptive and imaginative faculties of men in an identical or similar manner. Thus by the establishment of parks and art-galleries, through the maintenance of playgrounds and the encouragement of architecture, through wise city planning and the preservation of rural scenery, we provide permanent sources of emotional concord among the members of society. And, associated thus in the same experience of æsthetic enjoyment, individuals are drawn together, are led to consider and admire characteristics perceived in one another. This appreciation of nobilities of character which is the basis of true love, is itself fostered by some of the arts, notably poetry and music. In verse and song the noble qualities and splendid achievements of national heroes are celebrated, and a multitude of individuals are made one by the responsive thrill which such poetry and music awaken. Thus the development of civic consciousness and corporate feeling among fellow citizens leads to the realization

by the human will of Beauty and Love, ends of universal scope and capable of affording abiding satisfaction.

The moral will of modern man is seeking and, we find, is beginning to attain, an end which is genuinely universal. Genuinely, because concretely, universal in the sense of being all-comprehensive, a social life which provides for the possible personal development of all individuals in a completely civilized world. This undertaking of the modern spirit depends, as we have seen, upon faith—faith that existing facts and forces can all of them be adapted to the fulfilment of man's personal needs. Such faith, we must also acknowledge, has been in a large measure justified by the achievements to which it has led, by the amazing success of modern man in readjusting natural forces and reorganizing social institutions, with a view to his own larger personal satisfaction. Modern technical science has come to think of the natural universe not as a dead-weight of inert matter driven by equally blind

forces through endlessly repeated cycles of monotonous change, but as a great storehouse of unknown potencies, itself progressive, and containing limitless possibilities of further growth under the impulsion and control of intelligence. May we not, then, suppose that man has come within sight of the goal of his own progress? Is not the roadway at last cleared and open for the rapid advance of human volition to its own final and complete satisfaction? Have we not found the long-sought solution of the problems of human life and human destiny which have vexed man's spirit from the beginning of his career, in the modern programme of social progress through the betterment of human living conditions, both economic and social?

Before assenting to this optimistic view which is widely current in these days of evolutionary science, we must stop to consider certain facts that loom large and cast deep shadows in the path of modern progress. In the first place, we must admit that

modern man's control over nature is purchased at a staggering cost. The wonderful discoveries and inventions, the gigantic enterprises and vast undertakings of modern civilization have resulted in an incalculable amount of suffering and a countless number of premature deaths among human individuals. That such inventions and enterprises prevent suffering and loss of life—in most cases far more than they cause—is freely admitted. But neither can it be denied that they have brought with them new perils, new possibilities of disaster. The steamship, the steam railway, electric traction and illumination, the automobile, agencies of civilization and means of human betterment that they are, contribute each one of them to the growing number of accidental injuries and deaths that occur, particularly in our crowded centres of population. And when we turn to such enterprises as modern mining and bridge-building and tunnelling, the toll of life and limb paid by the workers is appalling. Of course it is

reasonable to hope that in the future the dangers and disasters which follow upon the employment of mechanical instruments may be lessened by further inventions. But suppose—which seems unlikely—that, by ingenuity, man is able to eliminate entirely the accidents which follow upon the employment of machinery by human society. This risk of injury and death must still be run by the inventor, the discoverer, the explorer, through whose intelligence and inventive skill society acquires the means of betterment. One who elicits hitherto unknown potencies of nature by chancing new combinations of her forces must frequently be prepared to stake his life in the venture. The discovery of a new serum costs the life of a devoted investigator; knowledge of a new explosive is purchased at the expense of a dozen killed and injured. The loss of the *Titanic* reminded civilized society that every step forward in the conquest of the sea is purchased at a considerable expense of human life; the same is true of modern railway



travel; the cost of conquering the air promises to be greatest of all. A colossal enterprise like the Panama Canal puts a premature end to hundreds if not to thousands of human careers; railways built to open rich tropical forests are flanked by the graves of the men who labored to construct them; we accept it as a matter of course that a great bridge or aqueduct or tunnel should take a life or two. Such penalty man has to pay for his success in harnessing the forces of nature to the chariot of his progress; it is inconceivable that in the future he should be able to continue his conquests except at a similar cost. Imagine, however, what seems to be impossible; that he should devise means of continuing his transformation of nature in perfect safety to himself. It is impossible to imagine him by any skill or invention doing away with physical death, and thus gaining for himself permanence of life. And as long as death remains there is conflict and antagonism between the natural conditions of man's existence and his per-

sonal needs—the conflict and antagonism in which physical evil is rooted. The death of an individual may evidently be for the benefit of humanity; such is the case with many individuals whose very death is a part of their service to humanity—the heroes, the patriots, the martyrs of all ages. The death of all individuals may even be shown to be in a certain sense favorable to the progress of the race, since it makes life while it lasts more intense, more significant. But these considerations do not solve the problem for the individual. His will demands a life which shall be universal in its scope, permanent in its achievement.

When we look from the physical to the social sphere we find a similar situation. That modern civilization is making progress with the work of reorganizing society in order to provide place for the different individualities that may claim a part in its life, is undeniable. But that this progress is made at the cost of arousing new enmities and oppositions, and without any certain

prospect of bringing about a complete reconciliation of interests, is also apparent. Modern social reform seeks so to reconstruct institutions and revise laws as to enforce the equal rights and the common interest of all individuals. Its aim is an adjustment so thoroughgoing that each individual may find in serving society a fulfilment of his own ambition. But in many cases the measures which are successful in correcting grave injustice are themselves productive of new conflict and discord. Our present economic system of free contract and free competition among individuals was effective in maintaining the rights of individuality as against the injustice of feudalism, but, as we all know, it has been productive of ruthless greed and unscrupulous rapacity. Free speech and a free press were valuable instruments in freeing the individual citizen from the oppression of the tyrant and in developing a public opinion which is favorable to the recognition of many larger social interests—but they have

given an unparalleled power to demagogues and demagoguery. The social innovator or reformer, like the inventor in the mechanical realm, must be willing to take his life in his hands. For he, through his experiments and reconstructions, runs the risk, if not of physical death, at least of loss of reputation and property and peace of mind. For human beings are uncertain quantities, social influences are elusive and incalculable, and one who attempts to establish new relations or make new adjustments is liable to reach unexpected and disconcerting results. If his attempt is successful he is given an honored place among the leaders of society; if unsuccessful, his own natural regret over his failure and wasted effort is made more bitter by the reproaches and ridicule of his fellows. Finally, experience gives us no reason to expect that by a social adjustment, no matter how complete, we can eliminate the necessity for self-sacrifice. When, in its simpler and more obvious expressions, it is rendered unnecessary by social prog-

ress, it reappears in subtler and more poignant forms. Progress, economic and social, may well secure such a plentiful production and equitable distribution of the means of subsistence that no individual need surrender his own possessions in order to relieve the distress of his fellows. But the claims of individuality will then assert themselves in the higher sphere of personal achievement. The individual will be confronted with the hard duty of giving up his opportunity for personal culture and achievement in order to perform his share of the labor required for the material support of mankind. The problem of self-sacrifice, the conflict of egoism and altruism, appears in the most acute and difficult form when the individual is obliged to give up not material possessions—for such surrender is frequently a blessing in disguise—but all opportunity for personal development and self-realization in order to support and care for others. In such cases the conditions of human existence seem to compel the individual to con-

sent to his own personal degradation in order to save and succor his needy fellows. Such conflicts between the claims of individual culture and social service promise to be the bitterest struggles of our future morality; for democratic society provides for the support of no special class privileged to enjoy the fruits of personal culture, but inspires in the heart of every individual the yearning for the larger personal development. Self-sacrifice cannot be removed from human life, therefore; because it is rooted in the private and exclusive character of individuality, and thus cannot be destroyed without destroying human nature itself.

Finally, we have to admit that the extension of human interests to cover the entire world, which is a distinguishing mark of modern civilization, has made possible evils of whose magnitude men have had until now only a dim foreboding, but which we in these years can realize in their dread actuality. The modern will, when true to

its professed universality, seeks world betterment. Hence, when citizens of a modern state devote themselves to national welfare, it should be with the understanding that the nation which they serve is a member of the family of nations, with a service to render to the international community. But world influence which is thus the rightful privilege of a nation, is easily confounded with a world power which is gained at the expense of other nations and maintained to their detriment. Thus the way is opened to a rivalry among nations for world power and a struggle to obtain the coveted mastery by diplomatic strategy and force of arms. And when nations, carried away by this ambition for world power, press into service all the discoveries of modern science and the products of modern invention to improve the enginery of war, and utilize all the costly triumphs of the modern mind in terrestrial, naval, and aerial locomotion for purposes of military expedition and attack, the result is slaughter so stupendous, de-

struction so colossal, as to exceed our powers of comprehension. The European war of 1914 has shown not merely that evil of gigantic proportions persists in modern society; it has also proved that there are forces still lurking in human nature which will, unless controlled, annihilate the whole fabric of modern civilization.

It turns out that democracy, the perfectly organized society of free persons, is a task and not a triumph of the modern will. Evil, that fatal presence, has not been overcome and eliminated from modern life; man has taken only the first few steps in its conquest, and is consequently able to count the cost of completing the enterprise. The great undertakings of the modern spirit, control of the forces of nature and adjustment of individualities in society, can be advanced only through the sacrifices of individuals. This tragic fact that the universal ideal which the moral will of man now proposes to realize, demands constant and real sacrifices from human individuals, is fre-



quently overlooked by optimistic meliorists. Man can subdue nature to his uses only through the sacrifice of his own comfort and safety; he can secure co-operation in society only through the sacrifice of his interests and private ambitions. The one part of his task involves peril and hardship, the other discipline and denial, and both entail struggle and suffering. Now such sacrifices are not easily made, nor should they be lightly dismissed. The natural will which strives to provide man with comfort and enjoyment during his physical lifetime, stoutly opposes such sacrifice. Moreover, this natural will revives and reasserts itself with renewed strength in modern times. For the modern spirit, which has sought to realize a "universal" end through a readjustment of actual conditions, has succeeded measurably well in attaining the "natural" good which man strove in vain to secure by depending directly upon the sequences of nature. Hence intelligent individuals whose situation is at all favorable may be

tolerably certain to-day of a life of profitable and pleasant activity and an old age of security and ease. Modern science and invention have multiplied a thousandfold the conveniences, the comforts, the safeguards of man's natural existence. Naturalism has thus taken fresh hold; it threatens to become the controlling influence in human life. The influence of such modern naturalism, of course, runs squarely counter to the devotion to a universal ideal which demands sacrifice of natural interest and individual ambition. Its prudential, calculating spirit once uppermost makes altogether impossible that willingness to sacrifice self required for pursuit of the universal good. If further progress is to be made, therefore, in attaining the end of universal human development, man must have the courage to resist the call of natural pleasures and to persevere in the path of struggle and of sacrifice.

One thing, and one thing only, can give to the modern man courage to make the sac-

rifices required in the realization of the universal life. That is *faith*—belief in the essential permanence, the fundamental reality, of personality. The personality which is here believed in is personality in its universal aspect, that personality which embraces and includes the lives of others in intimate and organic union. If such universal personality and not the narrower and more restricted character of the individual or the group is the real thing, then the man who furthers its development through the use of physical forces or of social agencies increases his own reality. He does so even if his work in the mechanical and social fields is done at the sacrifice of his own individual comfort or health or ambition or existence itself. Through his very sacrifice he will, under such assumption, identify himself most effectually with universal reality; he will raise himself to a higher plane of existence, he will thereby participate in the universal life for which his soul yearns. But how can such faith be gained or, rather,

regained after it has been lost in a grilling and benumbing warfare with refractory and unyielding conditions, both physical and social? Where else than from religion—man's never-failing resource when faith wavers and ideals lose their power? The human will can attain its ultimate end of a universal personal life only through persistent struggle and continued sacrifice. The courage required for such struggle and sacrifice comes only from faith, faith in the all-conquering power of personal will. Such faith is produced and sustained only by religion. The conclusion to which we are led, nay driven, is that the moral will of man can realize the universal good to which it aspires only if it is assisted and inspired by religious belief.

Let us set this conclusion clearly before us. The modern spirit can realize its ideal of a universal personal life only if it is strengthened and impelled by religious faith. The hope of progress, of democracy itself, lies in religion. Only if there is a

revival of religious faith can the human will prove equal to the high task it has undertaken. But the need is not for any religion whatsoever; not every religion would fulfil the requirements of the situation. No, in the present crisis of modern civilization, the supreme need is for a religion which shall give power and reality to the ideal of universal personal development and justify any sacrifices, no matter how great, made in its behalf. Is such a religion to be found? Fortunately for human progress, such a religion has been in existence for twenty centuries, awaiting the time when man should awake to an appreciation of its significance and avail himself of its power. The fundamental principles of Christianity, misconceived and misapplied as they have been, yet in spite of their misinterpretations proving the most potent influences that have ever worked for human betterment, constitute a religion such as we seek. At the heart of the teachings of Jesus is a revelation of the character and will of God.

In the Christian gospels God is revealed not as a being whose holiness raises him far above the human world and whose will is chiefly absorbed in increasing his own glory. This is the God of mediæval asceticism, not of Christianity. The teachings of the New Testament reveal to us a God who is actively engaged in the work of universal betterment. He is indeed the leader of the forces of righteousness and, like all true leaders, he shares the struggles and privations of the enterprise. He strives in the cause of universal progress, himself bearing the heaviest burden of toil and responsibility. His omnipotence is not conceived abstractly as the absence of every limitation in case of every power, an omnipotence which would make it impossible for him really to want, to desire, to seek after an object, because such purpose and pursuit would indicate a lack and an incompleteness in himself. Rather is his omnipotence shown positively and concretely in his moral perfection. And this moral perfec-

tion does not consist in a passionless purity, an exalted holiness. On the contrary, God's moral perfection finds expression according to the truly Christian view, in the personal quality to which we human beings attach highest moral value, *benevolence*—in benevolence, developed to the highest degree. Now benevolence, as we know it, is always directed upon persons and reaches its fullest development, its supreme manifestation, in suffering and sacrifice, for its personal object. In harmony with what is deepest and most profound in our moral experience, therefore, Christianity represents the benevolence of God as expressing itself in suffering and self-sacrifice for cherished creatures. It is the unique merit of Christianity that it dares to attribute these most searching and significant human experiences of suffering and sacrifice to God himself. God is revealed as a Father who loves his human children with the only perfect love.

Here, then, is the religious faith needed

to nerve man for the tremendous undertaking of modern civilization. This noble mission it can fulfil because it is of such character as first to arouse men to vigorous, persistent effort in the realization of universal ideals, and, second, to give them the hope and confidence which they must have if they are to undergo without discouragement or despair the pain and privation which this effort must cost them. Let us then consider a little further these two services which true religion promises to render man at this critical point in his moral development.

Belief in a God who is striving to realize all the possibilities for good in the universe is bound to inspire man with a zealous determination to do what he can to advance the cause of universal progress. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work," said Jesus, and man is encouraged by this conception of God to become a fellow-worker in the great task of evolution. If we wish to appreciate the superior mo-



tive power of such a religion, we have only to compare it with the types of religious belief dominant in the earlier stages of human progress. The God of the natural man, the God of power and of justice, had plans of His own to carry out which did not concern man, except to require his obedience in certain specific points. Man had also plans of his own to realize, and he had no interest in the purposes of Deity beyond rendering the specified services required to escape punishment and gain reward. Hence no real co-operation between man and God was possible; only a kind of compromise or working agreement in which each made a certain allowance for the interest of the other. Neither has the God of supernaturalism any possible need for assistance from man; He is engaged in no real undertaking. All that He purposes is already completely and finally realized in the perfection of his nature. Such a religion furnishes man with no incentive to spend himself in the work of world betterment. No

reason exists, in fact, why he should exert himself or show any particular zeal in improving worldly conditions. Every event in universal history is already foreordained, every emergency is provided for, down to the last detail; if evil seems to triumph or failure to threaten the divine plan, the danger is only apparent, and its appearance is due to our human short-sightedness. In such circumstances man is surely justified in turning his attention away from the earthly scene and in losing himself in visions of spiritual perfection. In complete contrast to these views stands the Christian conception which represents God as really working for that ideal of a universal life which the human will yearns to realize. Such belief imparts an added worth to that ideal of complete personal development which man in rare moments of spiritual vision has projected; it stamps the loftiest aim of modern civilization with the seal of divine authority and approval. Moreover, the belief that even God is striving and battling to over-

come adverse conditions implies the further belief that the unfinished task offers vast opportunities to men of doing real work, of performing real service. Men may expect by their efforts to make real contributions to universal progress, and since personal capacities differ, each individual may hope to accomplish results which no one else could achieve. To each human individual, therefore, the high privilege is given of becoming a fellow-worker with God, and of accomplishing a work which but for his effort must remain forever undone. Surely no nobler opportunity for service could be offered to man !

Besides kindling in the human heart a zeal to contribute something to universal progress, the Christian conception of God, if believed in with the whole heart, produces in the mind of man a serene confidence in his own personal destiny which enables him to undergo without flinching repeated suffering and painful death, if encountered in the path of duty. Such religious faith re-

vives man's faith in the permanence of his personality, in the indestructibility of the selfhood which he has by the exercise of his own will built up. Belief in personal immortality has been waning in the modern world, owing to man's increasing knowledge of the vastness of the physical universe and the might of its forces in comparison with which his own strength is so slight, his own efforts so feeble, his own life so evanescent, as to appear altogether negligible. This growing disbelief in immortality is one of the most ominous signs of the times; it means that the human will is losing confidence in its own powers. But without confidence in itself human volition is bound to prove entirely unequal to the task which confronts it. Let volition lose faith in its own ability to enlarge still further the scope of personal life and all hope of further progress is gone. The descent to naturalism and even to animalism will be precipitous and final. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that man preserve unshaken his belief

in the permanence of personality, in the unconquerable potency of his own rational will. Such a religion as that founded on the Christian revelation of God seems to be the only one that will meet the present need. The immortality which it promises is not one projected into another world nor postponed to a future life. It is a life which the human will achieves in the present world through its efforts and its struggles to convert existing conditions into means of universal good. If the God of the Christian gospels is supremely real, then reality is measured not in physical but in moral terms, not according to amount of physical energy but according to degree of moral excellence. Now the moral excellence to which supreme reality is attributed has its source in the expansive power of personality. This expansive power, identical, of course, with personal will, involves as a necessary feature in its working, suffering and self-sacrifice; for new objects can be sought only at the cost of abandoning old satisfactions,

new fields of activity can be discovered only by breaking down the barriers which have secured and protected hard-won sources of certain satisfaction. Suppose that God himself is not exempt from the suffering and self-sacrifice essential to personal development; suppose that he, as the guiding spirit in the work of universal progress, makes the greatest sacrifices, suffers the most intense pain. Then the man who endures suffering, who sacrifices his most cherished interests in his efforts to realize the Universal Ideal, does not have his reality lessened or destroyed thereby, even if his suffering diminish the amount of his physical strength or cut short the term of his natural existence. Rather does he increase his personal reality, since his very suffering and sacrifice gain him entrance to the fuller and more comprehensive life lived by God; his very pain and privation admit him into fellowship with God, into permanent union with the Supreme Reality. The efforts of the human will to extend

the range of its activity have, as we have seen, been continually frustrated by unfavorable conditions. In this, of course, consists evil—in the conflict of individual interests and of human welfare with the natural order. The result of this maladjustment is that the good of the whole can be attained only by the sacrifice of the parts. For this problem of evil the Christian faith proposes the only possible solution, by maintaining that the good of the parts is in its turn secured by the sacrifice of the whole. In the human individual, then, isolated fragment of reality as he may seem to be, the Universal Will, the principle of supreme reality, is struggling and striving to gain expression. And in so far as such individual, in obedience to the promptings of the larger will within him, sacrifices his narrower actual interest to the universal good, to just that degree is he claiming his birthright and winning permanent reality. Intelligence and will first appear in organic evolution as functions of the individual organism; their

office is to aid in adjusting this organism to the conditions of its environment and thus of prolonging its existence. But in man will has so far developed as to turn the tables on nature, and to utilize the living organism as an instrument by which to transform existing conditions, physical and social, so as to enlarge the scope of personal life. Suppose, now, that the will of a human individual succeeds in achieving this service, in thus contributing something to the personal development of humanity. Such an individual will is no longer the servant of a bodily organism, dependent upon it for very existence and bound to perish when it is dissolved into its elements. It has freed itself from bondage to the flesh; it has claimed its birthright of permanent reality; it has realized its potential universality. It has, in fact, become an expression of the Universal Will, manifesting itself through the multitude of individuals, and is destined to participate in the realization of the universal good.



Thus we reach our final conception of human progress. We see it as the work of volition, the effort of Universal Will to expand the sphere of its activity by availing itself of all the opportunities for further expression offered by the nature of things. But actual conditions prove refractory and unyielding. Volition is frequently checked and frustrated in its endeavor to bring them under control; it is confronted by the problem of natural evil. In overcoming these difficulties universal volition gains great advantage by dividing itself into a vast number of individual wills. Each of these individuals is able to concentrate its effort upon the exploitation of that particular one out of the many possibilities of nature with which it is in a position most effectively to deal. The achievements of individuals in the mastery of natural conditions are made permanent possessions of the Universal Will through communication and co-operation. But the individuals frequently prove obstinate and self-centred. They re-

fuse to make the results they have gained means to enlarging the scope of others' activity; they prefer a transient independence of action to a permanent participation in the universal achievement. The very conditions of individuation thus constitute another source of evil; the problem of moral evil is added to that of natural. This difficulty can be met only by imparting to individuals added personal power from the Universal Source, in order that the intrinsic universality belonging to all volition may serve to counteract the exclusive tendency of individuality. If this effect is not secured, the result of making individuals more powerful will of necessity be to make them more potent and mischievous in their independence. Thus universal progress is essentially a venture; as an enterprise of will its outcome is uncertain and fraught with possibilities of disaster and failure. But much ground has already been gained. Volition is constantly annexing new territory and thus enlarging the theatre of its

activity; it is successfully liberating itself from hampering conditions that circumscribe its activity, thus enlarging the scope of the free personal life for which in fullness it yearns. We are justified in hoping, therefore, that the will which is striving in universal evolution will not fail in its endeavor; that universal progress will not come short of its goal. We have found reason to believe, moreover, that the course of progress is not like the passing of a torch onward from one generation to the next, each generation falling into oblivion when its task is done, but rather like a rising tide, a tide of personal life constantly being augmented by the contributions of individuals who, having had a share in its labors, have won a right to participate in the satisfaction of final fulfilment, of complete self-realization.

## POSTSCRIPT

### THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

EVEN the briefest survey of the stages in social evolution is sufficient to demonstrate the importance of religion as a factor in human progress. To us religious belief has appeared as a product of human volition. Man's gods have been constructions of his imaginative intelligence, given objectivity by an effort of his own will. Religion has not been a mere by-product of social evolution, however; it ranks as a genuine achievement of the human will and plays an essential part in its progressive realization. It renews man's confidence in the power of his own will after repeated failures, and gives him hope and courage for a new venture. It serves as a defense for ground already gained in the expansion of human personality and points the way to new conquests possible in the realm of spirit. Nor should

the fact that the objects of religious belief are projections of the human will lead us to think that they altogether lack the reality possessed by other objects. Our study has shown us that the natural universe, with its multitude of existing things and many interacting forces, is likewise a construction of man's intelligent volition; is similarly a matter of faith with him. Religious belief gains reality, just as all other beliefs do, through a process of verification. Such verification comes in the results of action. If a belief, when acted upon, enlarges the scope of personal life and opens to the agent a more varied field for further activity, it is to that extent realized. For any course of action is itself a question put to Reality, and such a result as just suggested is a sign that Reality gives its sanction to the belief which prompted it. This is the test to which religion has constantly been subjected in the course of human progress, and no one can deny that it has stood the test successfully.

But there are degrees of completeness and of finality in verification. Thus a belief may stand verified because when acted upon it increases the control of conscious personality over the conditions of its activity, and later have to give way to another and different belief about the same object, which when put in practice still further increases the range of man's personal activity. In such cases the first belief possesses in comparison with the second only a provisional truth, a temporary validity. Now it must be confessed that religious belief has in stage after stage of human progress played this part of provisional truth, has time after time appeared as a temporary expedient, extremely valuable, absolutely necessary, in fact, to tide the human will over difficult places in its road of progress, but destined in every instance to give place to other and contrary beliefs about the nature of the world and the behavior of its forces. Thus the savage, when the fruit upon which he depends for his food-supply

fails to ripen, may make sacrifices to the deity which presides over vegetation, in the hope that he may supply other fruit of bush or tree. The belief which prompts him thus to act steadies and strengthens his will, while he searches the wood for other food; thus it is verified. But when man's advancing intelligence enables him to undertake systematic agriculture, his belief in the efficacy of natural causes to produce the desired results supersedes this primitive religious faith. The work of religion is not done, however; for upon a higher level we find it springing up anew. When unusual drouth interrupts the expected course of growth and fruition, man prays to God to send the needed rain, relying upon his promises to aid those human beings who obey and serve him. This more developed religion is in its turn superseded; man no longer prays for rain when, through the exercise of inventive skill, guided by the conclusions of exact science, he is able to devise improved methods of agriculture which

produce good crops in spite of deficient rainfall. Such facts as these, patent to the student of human progress, lead one inevitably to ask if religious belief is not essentially provisional in character, and if its object, the divine, is more than a vague adumbration or at best an imaginary symbol of natural processes as yet undiscovered but nevertheless requisite for the realization of man's will and the completion of his world?

This question comes home to us most sharply when we ask it concerning our religion of the present day, for it seems safe to suppose that the religious beliefs of modern civilized society represent religion in the fullest development to which it has yet attained. Must we believe that our own religion at its best is only an expression of our ignorance of forces which we nevertheless recognize as influencing human destiny, along with the determination to discover and utilize these forces? When we thus make the question one of the truth of



present forms of religion, we are compelled to recognize the existence in civilized society of variant tendencies in religious belief. Most prominent, perhaps, are two types which we may call *prudential* and *mystical*. Prudential religion relies upon God, as a being of power and purpose, to provide man with the material goods of earthly existence. Mystical religion appeals to God, as a being of transcendent purity and holiness, to free man from the limitations of earthly existence, and to elevate him to the sphere of abiding spiritual reality. These are, of course, the forms of religion previously described as characteristic of the "natural" and "supernatural" life, respectively. It will assist us in understanding the present religious situation if we review the leading characteristics of these two forms of religion.

Prudential religion springs from man's desire to provide for his own comfort and security during the period of his natural existence. This he attempts to do by

utilizing the resources of his physical environment. He takes heed of the more obvious processes of nature—the course of the seasons, the germination, growth, and fruition of plants, the nutrition and reproduction of animals, planting and gathering his crops, pasturing and breeding his flocks and herds. He becomes familiar with the more accessible materials—wood, stone, and iron—making tools and building himself houses and barns. But these natural forces and agencies prove untrustworthy; through their uncertain and incalculable action his plans are set at naught, his prospects ruined, his health and very existence are placed in jeopardy. The drouth destroys his crops, the pestilence kills his herd, fire and storm devastate his dwellings. In this emergency he has recourse to religion to renew his confidence in his own ability to insure future well-being in the presence of an uncertain and sometimes hostile environment. The Deity in whom he believes is not the “mysterious power” of the savage,

however; He is endowed with personality and possessed of definite purposes which He is interested in realizing. With such a God it is possible to bargain or, if the term be preferred, to covenant. The man who obeys His will, acknowledging His sovereignty, and worshipping Him according to the prescribed ritual, He will protect from accident and calamity, will preserve in health and prosperity. For, besides being powerful, God is just—just in the sense of paying what is due in the way of reward or penalty. The reward of those who obey the divine commands is at first supposed to come within the limits of earthly existence. But experience proving that fortune does not discriminate between believers and unbelievers in this present world, the divine judgment with its ensuing rewards and penalties is postponed to a future life. But the relation maintained between God and man is the same in both cases.

Mystical religion springs from man's yearning after a spiritual good, for the cul-

tivation of his own soul through the knowledge of absolute truth and this perception of ideal beauty. To such spiritual ends we find him turning when, through repeated failure, he is led finally to despair of obtaining any certain natural good. In contrast to wealth and reputation and pleasure, which are at the mercy of a fickle fortune, these spiritual goods appear to depend solely upon the choice and inspiration of the human will. Thus man comes to place over against the natural world, which he repudiates as worthless and disappointing, a supernatural realm, which he regards as his eternal home. But it is difficult for him to maintain his faith in the supreme reality of such a supernatural realm. The natural world presses in upon him; hunger and cold, sickness and death constantly obtrude themselves upon his attention. To strengthen his faith in the supernatural good to which he has devoted himself, he again has recourse to religion. God is this time so conceived as to impart superior and

abiding reality to the supernatural world and the spiritual life. He is characterized by his personal purity, which raises him out of any contaminating contact with the natural world and its many evils. To power and justice are now added holiness as his distinguishing attribute. Such a God can enter into relation with the world of human affairs only through mediators who bridge the abysmal gulf between the natural and the supernatural. Through the assistance of such mediators, however, man may return to God; he may at once begin the life of supernatural reality, of spiritual bliss. Naturally, individuals thus saved from the world will desire during the rest of their earthly existence to withdraw from human society in order that, undistracted by worldly affairs, they may taste the joys of the heavenly vision.

Turning now from the past to the present, we see both these types of religion existing in our civilized societies. Much of what passes for Christian faith is either pruden-

tial or mystical in character, or a mixture of both. But the student of social and moral evolution is bound to conclude that these two types of religion have lost their value for civilized man and, consequently, are doomed to disappear from modern society. This is not because the needs which evoked them have disappeared; man labors no less arduously to provide for his own future security and comfort; he seeks no less earnestly the higher spiritual goods. But he has found other and more effective means of satisfying these needs than those furnished by prudential and mystical religion. Modern man secures his own natural existence and well-being, not by bargaining for divine protection against natural ills, but by gaining mastery over natural forces through his own experimental science, inventive skill, and technical proficiency. He does not rely upon divine providence to protect him from shipwreck at sea; he makes a compass, constructs a steamship, invents the wireless telegraph. He does not

expect to avert drouth by prayer; through scientific research and experiment he so improves his methods of agriculture that a decided diminution of the rainfall does not ruin his crops. He does not attempt to check epidemic by religious sacrifices and processions; he discovers the cause of disease, learns how to destroy malignant germs or prevent their communication. With regard, secondly, to the spiritual goods whose acquisition mystical religion pretends to insure, modern man has learned that these are attained not by individuals who withdraw from worldly pursuits and devote themselves to supernatural concerns, but by those who avail themselves most successfully of the spiritual resources of their fellow-men, as these are developed through personal association and co-operation. Hence modern society aims so to organize its activities that the insights, the inventions, and the appreciations of all can be appropriated by each one and made contributory to his personal development. To

this end it establishes popular education and promotes free discussion, it encourages research and rewards invention, it fosters art and stimulates wholesome play.

It is evident that these two undertakings, the control of nature through the application of science to industry and the development of man's personal powers through the organized activities of society, are the purposes of democracy. In fact, taken together, they constitute the programme of democracy. For democracy is more than the abstract ideal of equality. It is the ideal of a society which provides for the free personal development of all its members. But it is also a method. Material necessities and comforts it proposes to produce and distribute through the co-operative industry of its citizens; no privileged class is to be permitted to live in idleness, supported by the labor of the remainder. And it proposes to find means of spiritual culture in this very co-operative industry. For no class is to be exempted from toil and given



leisure for thought and enjoyment; hence, if spiritual values are to be realized, they must be found in the performance of the common task. But this turns out to be their true source, since industry can become genuinely co-operative only on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual helpfulness, mutual sympathy, and out of these arise knowledge and power and love of beauty, the choicest gifts of the spirit. Democracy is thus the modern method of fulfilling those needs which prudential and mystical religion arose to satisfy. No wonder that democracy has appealed to many minds as a substitute for religion or, perhaps better, as itself a religion! That it is a substitute for prudential and mystical religion, thus supplanting them both, seems indubitable. If religion can have no function beyond ministering to man's need for natural security and spiritual culture, its work appears to be already done and its eventual disappearance inevitable. Or, to put the matter differently, unless new needs arise, which no existing agency, nat-

ural or social, can fulfil, religion has no further part to play in human history. Have such needs arisen? More definitely, has democracy, in providing a method for the fulfilment of man's needs, natural and spiritual, created new needs which only religion can satisfy? An attempt to answer this question will bring us at once to what is truly the religion of the present—the religion of modern civilized society. It represents the highest development of the religious consciousness; it has already been described as the religion of the universal life.

On what force does democracy depend for the accomplishment of its task of promoting the personal development of its members? Clearly, upon the thoroughgoing co-operation of its members, upon the absolute devotion of individuals to the comprehensive social good. Such complete co-operation of mankind in the work of subjugating nature and cultivating the powers of personality can be obtained only at the expense of the private interests of individuals. Every great enterprise which aims to increase

man's control over natural forces lays its tax upon the health, takes its toll of the lives of the individuals employed; the construction of a great canal, railway, bridge, or tunnel, is expected to involve many casualties among the workers. So also with invention and discovery; the discoverer of a new serum pays with his own life; those who first employ a new remedy jeopardize their own health and safety. The cost to individuals who participate in the work of spiritual enlightenment and progress, if less obvious, is none the less real. They may not risk their health or their lives, but they are forced to give up private preferences and individual ambitions as dear to them as life itself. One who labors for the spiritual advancement of humanity cannot allow his own taste and talents, in science or in art, to interfere with his social responsibility; nay, more, he must be prepared to suffer misunderstanding and even opprobrium on account of his devotion to social progress and reform.

Such devotion of individuals to social

welfare as democracy presupposes thus involves real sacrifice on their part—the endurance of pain, privation, and even death itself, in the service of society. Is it reasonable to expect from human individuals a willingness thus to devote themselves to a social ideal, the capacity for sacrificing their private interests to its service? On one condition only—that the mass of men are convinced that the larger social life, the life of human personality in its universal aspect, is more permanent, more potent, more real than the existence of the natural individual or his private interest. If such is the true view, then it is evident that the individual who surrenders his private interests, spends his strength, and shortens his natural life in devoted service of society, gains, not loses, in personal development; since through his very suffering and sacrifice he raises himself to a higher plane of reality, that of universal spiritual life. But this cannot be proved; it must remain a matter of faith. On the existence of this faith democracy is altogether

dependent, but is of itself powerless to produce it. Here, then, is the new need created by democracy, which religion can alone fulfil—the need of faith in the superior reality of the social community, the community of persons united through mutual understanding, service, and sympathy, over that of natural individuality, with its narrow interests and exclusive ambitions. Here, too, is the function of religion in a democracy—that of giving supernatural sanction or, better, spiritual reality, to those social values which have become supreme in the course of human progress.

That form of present-day religion which promises to dominate the future is neither prudential nor mystical, it is ethical and social. What particular forms it may take as time goes on cannot, of course, be predicted. But it may serve to make more definite the meaning of social religion if we try to state the fundamental doctrines which such a religion must proclaim in order to discharge its function of upholding

the reality of social values. Such a religion must teach, it would appear:

1. An immortality of the human person conditioned by his devotion to inclusive social ends and consequent identification with the life of the spiritual community. The future life, as an occasion for reward or punishment, has ceased to interest the modern man or move him to action. No more powerful moral dynamic could be imagined, however, than that supplied by belief in an immortality which may be won—an immortality which offers an opportunity for further personal development to those individuals who in their earthly existence have devoted themselves to universal ends.

2. The existence of a spiritual community made up of those persons who during the period of their earthly existence labored faithfully for the universal human good, and who, after death has removed them from the earthly scene, constantly inspire men to deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice in the

service of society. The leaders of this community are the great moral teachers and heroes of the race; prominent in it are the saints and the sages, the patriots and the martyrs, who through the long centuries have striven to benefit their fellow-men; present, also, are all those who in obscure and humble station have faithfully discharged their social vocation.

3. The immanence and efficacy of God as the guiding spirit of social progress, the leader in the work of human betterment, who strives and suffers with us in the cause of universal evolution.

And now we come to the crucial question—the question that is ever hovering in the mind of one who considers the “enlightened” religion of the present as the outcome of age-long religious evolution. Must we suppose that this final form of religious belief is also but a temporary expedient destined to disappear at the time when a wider experience has furnished man with a scientific knowledge of the facts of the social

consciousness, its true character and manner of growth? Before venturing to suggest an answer to this question we should inquire what sort of facts would, if known, render unnecessary the social religion of the present, and how such knowledge could be acquired. Now, if the preceding argument be sound, this knowledge must be that of the permanence and continued development of conscious personality in its universal social aspect. Such knowledge as this will be gained only when the experience of those individuals who have striven and suffered for inclusive human ends during their natural existence, and thereafter continue to participate in the labors and satisfactions of social progress, is communicated to their brethren whose outlook is limited to the visible world. Is it probable that human science will devise methods for receiving such communications? Sir Oliver Lodge believes that he and his fellow-workers in the Society for Psychical Research have already received preliminary communications



of this kind and that these communications, increasing in number and significance in the near future, promise to furnish men with new sources of power and inspiration. The painstaking work of such investigators in a difficult and suspected field deserves our admiration, and their opinions should receive respectful attention. As yet they have not convinced many persons whose acquaintance with the phenomena under investigation and with the conditions of scientific verification generally renders them competent judges. The majority of us remain sceptical, probably from a conviction, strong if not explicitly justified, that such facts as these, if they are ever made known, will not be communicated through the channels which are being sounded by the Society for Psychological Research. But suppose that such knowledge should be acquired, either in this manner or in some other. Will it mean that religion is finally discredited and superseded? Nay, shall we not rather say, confirmed and completed? For in that case

what religion has for so long seen with the eye of faith will at last have been empirically made known—that Spirit is the ultimate and prevailing reality.

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